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THE EMERGING DUTY TO BARGAIN 
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
Harry T. Edwards* 
NEARLY two decades ago, the report of the ABA Committee on Labor Relations of Governmental Employees suggested that 
a government which imposes upon private employers certain obliga-
tions in dealing with their employees, may not in good faith refuse 
to deal with its own public servants on a reasonably similar basis 
modified, of course, to meet the exigencies of public service.1 
A decade later, Professor Russell Smith and Theodore Clark ob-
served that 
both the increasing number of state and local employees and the 
burgeoning unionization of such employees have made it imperative 
that the states develop some kind of policy in response to the needs 
and aspirations of public employees which, at the same time, will 
suitably take account of characteristics peculiar to public employ-
ment.2 
Both the ABA Report and the Smith and Clark article are 
significant because they remark about the disparate treatment that 
has historically been reserved for public sector employees, vis-a-vis 
their private sector brethren, in the labor relations laws in the United 
States. The ABA Report, which was written in 1955, proclaimed that 
public employees should, as a matter of fairness, have bargaining 
rights comparable to those enjoyed by private employees. The Smith 
and Clark article, written ten years later, pragmatically suggested 
that formalized bargaining structures should be created as a matter 
of expediency to deal with the then obvious surge in the growth of 
public sector unionism. 
Today, the debate over the legitimacy of unionism in the govern-
ment sector is largely academic. Unionization of government employ-
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1. 1955 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS 
LAW, R:£l'ORT OF COMMITTEE ON LABOR RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES 89, 90. 
2, Smith &: Clark, Reappraisal of the Role of the States in Shaping Labor Relations 
Laws, 1965 WIS. L. REv. 411, 423. 
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ees and collective bargaining in the public sector are now recognized, 
albeit not always accepted, facts of life in the United States. On this 
score, it was recently reported that 
[p ]ublic employee unions are showing a remarkable rate of growth 
at a time when labor unions in the private sector are expanding 
slowly, if at all. Thirty-seven years after Congress passed the Wagner 
Act to clear the way for mass organizing efforts, about one of every 
four workers on private payrolls belongs to a union. In the 13 years 
since Wisconsin approved a pioneering law that encouraged union-
ization of its state and local government employees, one of every 
three public workers has enlisted in union ranks. There are now 34 
states with laws providing some labor relations framework for deal-
ing with organizations of government employees. The Federal Gov-
ernment now bargains on non-wage issues with unions formed by 
its employees and Congress has approved collective bargaining for 
employees of the semi-independent U.S. Postal Service, with arbitra-
tion of wage disputes if necessary. 
Traditionally docile government workers have shown a new mil-
itancy in recent years, often defying state laws to strike for their de-
mands despite hostile public reaction.3 
The issue of concern now is not the propriety of unions in the 
public sector, but rather the viability of legislated structures cur-
rently being enacted to formalize collective bargaining for public 
employees. Since the first such statutes, enacted in the 1950's,4 public 
sector labor relations law has experienced a rapid and accelerating 
growth. In 1971 alone, nineteen states adopted legislation to change 
their labor relations procedures.5 In 1972, new statutes were enacted 
in Wisconsin,6 Minnesota,7 and Alaska.8 
While this proliferation of new and modified legislation may give 
some evidence of the increased growth of public sector unionism, 
unfortunately it also suggests that federal, state, and municipal gov-
ernments are experiencing certain difficulties in developing viable 
systems of labor relations. Some of these problems stem from an al-
most slavish adherence to the notion that the public and private 
8. Ax.As. STAT, §§ 23.40.070-.260 (1972). 
at 1. 
4. Act of Aug. 1, 1960, ch. 561, [1960] Mass. Acts & Resolves 488, as amended, MASs. 
ANN. LAws ch. 149, §§ 178G-N (Supp. 1972); Act of April 27, 1957, ch. 781, § 1, [1957) 
Minn. Laws 1073, as amended, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.61-.77 (Supp. 1973); Act of 
July 14, 1955, ch. 255, § I, [1955] N.H. Laws 386 (codified at N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:3 
(1970)); Act of Sept. 22, 1959, ch. 509, § 1, [1959] Wis. Laws 623, as amended, Wrs. STAT. 
ANN. § 111.70 (Supp. 1973). 
5. Eaton, supra note 3, at 1. 
6. Wrs. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.80-.97 (Supp. 1973). 
7. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.61-.77 (Supp. 1973). 
8. ALAS. STAT. §§ 23.40.070.260 (1972). 
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sectors cannot be treated alike. Legal scholars and politicians con-
tinue to restate the truism that the two sectors are vastly different 
because of certain legal, economic, and political constraints unique 
to the public sector.9 From this it has been assumed that, for purposes 
of collective bargaining, private sector legal concepts developed pur-
suant to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)10 cannot be 
adopted in the public sector.11 The 1955 ABA Report illustrates this 
assumption in its suggestion that bargaining be allowed in the public 
sector, "modified, of course, to meet the exigencies of public ser-
vice."12 Similarly, in the Smith and Clark article the authors called 
for special legislation which "will suitably take account of charac-
teristics peculiar to public service."13 
Whether the public sector is indeed sufficiently different from the 
private sector to warrant the assumption that private sector prece-
dents should be avoided, or at least modified, is a question that 
can and has been argued at length;14 therefore, it will serve no useful 
purpose to rehash the issue in this Article. Rather, it is probably 
sufficient to observe that, for the most part, legislators and judges 
at the federal, state, and municipal levels have assumed that the two 
sectors are different; as a consequence, the initial legislative and 
judicial reactions to public sector unionism have been cautious. 
Arguments about sovereign authority and the unlawful delegation 
of legislative authority abound in the early cases;15 the strike pro-
scriptiqn was declared as an inviolable principle;16 and strict limits 
were imposed on the process and scope of collective bargaining.17 
9. See generally Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 
67 MICH. L R.Ev. 943 (1969); Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Rela-
tions, 85 HARv. L. R.Ev. 459 (1971); Burton &: Krider, The Role and Consequences of 
Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418 (1970); Edwards, The Developing Labor 
Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10 DUQUESNE L. REV. 357 (1972); Kheel, Resolving 
Deadlocks Without Banning Strikes, MONTHLY LAB. R.Ev., July 1969, at 62; Wellington 
&: Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 
1107 (1969). 
10. 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-68 (1970). 
11. See, e.g., H. WELLINGTON &: R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CmES 146-48 (1971). 
12. 1955 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, supra note 1, at 90 (em-
phasis added). 
13. Smith&: Clark, supra note 2, at 423 (emphasis added). 
14. See articles cited in note 9 supra. 
15. E.g., City of Fort Smith v. Council 38, AFSCME, 245 Ark. 409, 433 S.W .2d 153 
(1968); Mugford v. Mayor &: City Council, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1946); City of 
Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947); Firefighters Local 293 v. 
Gardner, 406 Pa. 395, 178 A.2d 691 (1962). 
16. E.g., Norwalk Teachers' Assn. v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 
(1951). 
17. E.g., Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1969). 
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However, as is frequently the case, the passage of time (coupled with 
the continued growth of public sector unionism) has apparently 
caused a mellowing of attitudes. 
I. THE RIGHT To ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY 
It is now generally accepted that public employees have a consti-
tutional right, under the first amendment, to organize and join labor 
unions.18 On the theory that this right is essentially meaningless un-
less the employer is compelled to bargain collectively with his em-
ployees, it has even been suggested that public employees may, pur-
suant to constitutional precept, compel a public employer to engage 
in collective bargaining. In Indianapolis Education Association v. 
Lewallen,19 a federal district court found that the unilateral actions 
of a school board in sending out individual contracts to teachers and 
adopting a salary benefit schedule in derogation of the exclusive 
bargaining agent of the teachers constituted unjustifiable interfer-
ence with the teachers' fundamental right to engage in collective 
bargaining. However, the Seventh Circuit reversed and held that 
there is no constitutional right to compel an employer to bargain.20 
Despite this reversal, the ember of the concept that a public 
employer is under a constitutionally mandated duty to have regular 
dealings with a recognized union continues to glow. Recently, Judge 
Merhige, sitting in the Eastern District of Virginia, ruled that a 
public employee union had stated a cause of action by claiming that 
the employer's refusal to communicate with the union had a "chill-
ing effect" on the employees' first amendment rights.21 Only a few 
months before, a different judge sitting in the same district had 
held that a public employee union was not entitled to an order re-
quiring a municipal employer to bargain.22 Notwithstanding this 
earlier precedent, Judge Merhige suggested that "the grant of ap-
proval to organize and associate without the corresponding grant of 
recognition may well be an empty and meaningless gesture."23 Since 
the case was initially decided on a motion to dismiss, it is not yet 
clear whether Judge Merhige will seek to remedy the alleged "chill-
ing effect" by compelling the public employer to bargain with the 
employees' representative. 
18. E.g., McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968). 
19. 71 L.R.R.M. 2898 (S.D. Ind. 1969). 
20. Indianapolis Educ. Assn. v. Lewallen, 72 L.R.R.M. 2071, 2072 (1969). 
21. Richmond Educ. Assn. v. Crockford, 80 L.R.R.M. 3116 (1972). 
22. Fire Fighters Local 794 v. City of Newport News, 339 F. Supp. 13 (1972). 
23. 80 L.R.R.M. at 3117. 
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The decision by Judge Merhige raises the novel suggestion that, 
while a public employer may not be bound to "bargain," especially 
in the absence of legislation which compels collective negotiations, 
there may nevertheless be some lesser constitutionally mandated duty 
to communicate and consult with the employees' union. A similar 
suggestion was made in a different context by a New Jersey state 
court in New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. AFSCME.24 The court 
rejected the contention that the article in the New Jersey constitu-
tion guaranteeing that "persons in public employment shall have the 
right to organize, present to and make known to the State ... their 
grievances and proposals through representatives of their own choos-
ing"25 was designed to guarantee or institute collective bargaining. 
However, the court did rule that the disputed provision imposed an 
affirmative obligation on public employers to confer with employee 
representatives and to "consider in good faith" proposals and griev-
ances.26 Although there have been these indications of a right to 
consultation, most state courts have held that the state legislature 
must specifically authorize public sector collective bargaining before 
they will recognize, or require, full collective bargaining.27 
II. THE EMPLOYER'S AUTHORITY To BARGAIN 
Somewhat different from the question of whether a governmental 
employer may be compelled to bargain is the question of whether it 
has the authority to bargain in the absence of legislative sanction. 
The traditional view followed by many courts has been that "a 
public agency has no legal authority to bargain or contract with a 
labor union in the absence of express statutory authority."28 How-
24, 83 N.J. Super. 389,200 A.2d 134 (1964). 
25. N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 19. 
26. 83 N.J. Super. at 397,200 A.2d at 139. 
27. E.g., Delaware River &: Bay Authority v. International Organization of Masters, 
45 N.J. 138, 211 A.2d 789 (1965); International Longshoremen's Assn. v. Georgia Ports 
Authority, 217 Ga. 712, 124 S.E,2d 733 (1962). 
28, Operating Engrs, Local 321 v. Water Works Bd., 276 Ala. 462, 463, 163 S.2d 
619, 620 (1964). The extent of the common-law restriction on bargaining was recently 
exemplified by the decision of the Arizona court of appeals in Board of Educ. v. 
Scottsdale Educ. Assn., - Ariz. App. -, 498 P.2d 578 (1972), in which the court voided 
an existing contract between the board of education and the teachers association and 
held that the board had the authority to "negotiate" with the teachers only insofar 
as "negotiation" meant "meeting and consulting." - Ariz. App. at -, 498 P,2d at 
583. The court also ruled that the board was not free to delegate its authority to 
manage and control the school district without specific legislative authorization. See 
also International Longshoremen's Assn. v. Georgia Ports Authority, 217 Ga. 712, 124 
S.E.2d 733 (1962); Weakly County Mun. Elec. Sys. v. Vick, 43 Tenn. App. 524, 309 
S,W,2d 792 (1957). 
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ever, exceptions to this rule have occasionally been made where a 
governmental agency is functioning in a proprietary manner, as in 
the operation of a port authority or municipal electric system.20 The 
public employer's authority to bargain collectively is implied from 
the agency's broad powers to make contracts for workers and to man-
age the enterprise. The courts in these cases have accepted the theo-
retical notion that where a governmental entity performs a propri-
etary function it must be allowed to operate as efficiently as a private 
business;30 this includes the freedom to devise means of effectively 
competing in the labor market.31 
Today, the importance of these occasional judicial attempts to 
distinguish between "proprietary" and "uniquely governmental" 
functions has lessened.32 For one thing, the increasing size and com-
plexity of government makes it nearly impossible to draw any mean-
ingful line between proprietary and governmental functions. For 
another, more than a majority of the states and the federal govern-
ment have statutes, ordinances, or executive orders regulating labor 
relations in the public sector. Thus, in at least some jurisdictions, the 
need for judicial creativity to encourage or sanction collective bar-
gaining is less compelling now than in years past. 
Only one significant decision, rendered by an Illinois court of 
appeals, has held that a public employer has the authority, in a non-
proprietary area and absent a statute, to engage in private-sector-type 
collective bargaining with an exclusive representative of the em-
ployees in an appropriate unit.33 As previously noted, other state 
courts have held that a public employer may engage in some lesser 
degree of bargaining, such as formal or informal communication or 
29. E.g., Local 266, !BEW v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 
78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954); Christie v. Port of Olympia, 27 Wash. 2d 534, 179 
P.2d 294 (1947). 
30. Local 266, !BEW v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 78 
Ariz. 30, 275 P .2d 393 (1954). 
31. Christie v. Port of Olympia, 27 Wash. 2d 534, 179 P.2d 294 (1947). 
32. See, e.g., Indiana Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), in which the 
Supreme Court rejected the proprietary-governmental distinction as inherently un-
sound in applying the Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 735, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified 
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The distinction may yet have some life in states, 
such as Arizona, which have not yet adopted public sector bargaining statutes. E.g., 
Local 266, !BEW v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 
275 P.2d 393 (1954). 
33. Chicago Div. of Ill. Educ. Assn. v. Board of Educ., 76 Ill. App. 2d 456, 222 
N.E.2d 243 (1966). However, while a public employer may be authorized to recognize 
and bargain collectively with a union, he is not required to do so in Illinois. Cook 
County Police Assn. v. City of Harvey, - Ill. App. 2d -, 289 N.E.2d 226 (1972). The 
Illinois precedent established in Chicago Division has recently been followed in In-
diana. Local 511, Teachers v. Board of Trustees, - Ind. App. -, 287 N.E.2d 891 
(1972); Local 4, Teachers v. School City of Gary, - Ind. App. -, 284 N.E.2d 108 (1972). 
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consultation with employee groups,34 but these courts have not 
imposed any affirmative obligation on the employer to engage in 
such consultations. 
In the cases that hold that a public employer has no inherent 
authority to bargain collectively, the courts usually justify their 
decisions on the grounds that collective bargaining detracts from the 
sovereign authority of the state35 or that it results in an illegal dele-
gation of power.36 However, the knowledge, derived from actual 
experience, that public sector collective bargaining does not auto-
matically endanger the community has tended to dispel the long-held 
belief that "[t]o tolerate or recognize any combination of civil service 
employees ... is not only incompatible with the spirit of democracy, 
but inconsistent with every principle upon which our government is 
founded."37 On the other hand, although the sovereignty and dele-
gation concepts are relied on less frequently today to void contracts 
freely entered into between public employers and employees, the 
continuing impact of these theories cannot be discounted or ignored. 
The best evidence of the present vitality of these doctrines may be 
seen in the federal sector, where the courts have consistently refused 
to interfere with labor relations problems in the federal civil service 
arising under Executive Order No. 11,491.38 
Ill. THE IMPACI' OF THE STRIKE PROSCRIPTION ON 
THE DUTY To BARGAIN 
Before launching into an examination of the nature of the duty 
to bargain in the public sector, one final passing comment is war-
ranted. Probably the most significant distinction between the public 
and private sectors is the long-standing and universally followed 
prohibition against public employee strikes. In most states and in 
the federal service, there is a common-law or legislated proscription 
34. E.g., Board of Educ. v. Scottsdale Educ. Assn., - Ariz. App. -, 498 P .2d 578 
(1972); Nonvalk Teachers' Assn. v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951); 
State Bd. of Regents v. Packing House Workers Local 1258, 175 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 
1970). 
35. E.g., Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P .2d 741 (1946); 
Miami Water Works Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 S.2d 194 (1946); City 
of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W .2d 539 (1947). 
36. E.g., City of Fort Smith v. Council 38, AFSCME, 245 Ark. 409, 433 S.W .2d 153 
(1968); Mugford v. Mayor &: City Council, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1946). Cf. State 
ex rel. Local 350, Fire Fighters v. Johnson, 46 Wash. 2d 114, 278 P.2d 662 (1955). 
37. Railway Mail Assn. v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 875, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601, 607 (Sup. 
Ct. 1943), reud. on other grounds sub nom. Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 267 App. Div. 
470, 47 N.Y.S.2d 404, afjd., 293 N.Y. 315, 56 N.E.2d 721 (1944), afjd., 326 U.S. 88 (1945). 
38. 3 C.F.R. 262 (1973). See, e.g., Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 
350 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966); Lodge 1647, AFGE v. 
McNamara, 291 F. Supp. 286 (M.D. Pa. 1968). 
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of the right to strike in the public sector.39 Only Alaska, Hawaii, 
Montana, Pennsylvania, and Vermont have enacted legislation giving 
public employees a limited right to strike.40 
Labor leaders, of course, have argued that the absence of the 
strike weapon in the public sector reduces collective bargaining to 
collective begging.41 Yet, the validity of such a conclusion is at best 
speculative. There is enough data to suggest that, in the public 
sector, there may be a de facto right to strike, despite the legal strike 
bans in force.42 The threat or exercise of this de facto right to strike 
appears to be no less effective than the legalized right enjoyed by 
employees in the private sector. Moreover, it is possible that statutory 
impasse procedures, such as arbitration, fact-finding, and legislative 
hearings, may be a source of great bargaining leverage for public 
unions. For example, many municipal employers in Michigan have 
claimed that the state's compulsory arbitration act for policemen and 
:firemen43 has produced arbitrated settlements far in excess of what 
might have been produced by traditional collective bargaining.4' 
There obviously is no sure way to test this hypothesis, but the claim 
at least raises the question of how much, if any, bargaining power 
unions actually lose by virtue of the strike ban in the public sector. 
The strike proscription probably does change the bargaining 
process in the public sector, primarily because of the introduction 
39. See, e.g., United Fedn. of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C.), 
afjd., 404 U.S. 802 (1971); Anderson Fedn. of Teachers v. School City of Anderson, 252 
Ind. 558, 251 N.E.2d 15 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970). 
40. AI.As. STAT. § 23.40.200(d) (1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12 (Supp. 1971); MoNT, 
REv. ConF:S .ANN. § 41-2209 (Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Supp. 1972); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1704 (Supp. 1972). See generally Edwards, supra note 9, at 
376-78. 
41. See, e.g., Wolk, Public Employee Strikes-A Survey of the Condon-Wadlin Acts, 
13 N.Y. L.F. 69, '17 (1967); Bus. WEEK, Dec. 3, 1966, at 94. 
42. See U.S. BUREAU OF l.ABoR STATISIICS, DEPT. OF LABOR, "\\Tome STOPPAGES IN 1971 
(SELECTED FINAL TABULATIONS) 2, 6 crune 1972). There were at least 70 teacher strikes 
in the fall of 1972. BNA GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT [hereinafter GERR] 
No. 471, at B-10 to -14 (Sept. 25, 1972). 
43, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.231-.247 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1972). 
44. In its September 1972 convention the Michigan Municipal League adopted the 
following resolution: 
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, That the Michigan Municipal League 
in convention assembled this 28th day of September, 1972, records its continued 
opposition to the compulsory arbitration of public employee labor disputes in 
principle because it is destructive of free collective bargaining throughout the 
public sector and is an improper intrusion on the legislative authority of local 
governing bodies, impairing their ability to carry out their sworn duties to their 
electors •••• 
LMRS NEWSLEITER, Nov. 1972, at 1. 
The Michigan Municipal League has been joined in its opposition to compulsory 
police and fire arbitration provisions by similar groups in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming. Id. at 1-2. The extent of this opposition is significant since compulsory police 
and fire arbitration legislation is now in effect in only six states and New York City. Id. 
at I. 
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of and heavy reliance on statutory impasse procedures, which are not 
common in the private sector. However, it is not at all clear that 
the strike ban in the public sector produces any measurable change 
in the "power politics" seen at the bargaining tables. 
IV. THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATION To 
BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY 
As noted earlier, the bargaining obligation, if it exists, is usually 
imposed by statute. At last count, at least thirty-four states had stat-
utes imposing some kind of bargaining obligation in the public 
sector.45 The significance of a statute in establishing the parameters 
of collective bargaining cannot be overemphasized. As Reynolds 
Seitz has noted: 
[A] statute can spell out election procedures to be used in the deter-
mination of a majority representative in an appropriate unit. It can 
make clear that bargaining is to be on an exclusive basis with the 
organization that represents the majority representative in an appro-
priate unit. It can express other intents. I£ there is no statute, what-
ever attempts are made at bargaining may break down in arguments 
over procedure and over such questions as exclusive representation.46 
The courts share the view that public sector collective bargaining 
statutes are important. In fact, at least one court has taken the ini-
tiative in prodding the legislature to enact such a statute. In Dade 
County Classroom Teachers Association v. Legislature of the State 
of Florida,41 the Florida supreme court held that a public sector 
bargaining statute or a judicial equivalent thereof was not only 
necessary but required by that state's constitution.48 The court ap-
parently concluded that the absence of statutory guidelines consti-
tuted a denial or abridgment of the constitutional right of public 
employees to bargain collectively, and therefore warned the legisla-
ture that failure to pass such guidelines would force the court to 
accomplish the same result by judicial fiat. However, the association's 
request for mandamus to force the legislature to enact a statute was 
45. For an exhaustive list of these statutes, see Blair, State Legislative Control over 
the Conditions of Public Employment: Defining the Scope of Collective Bargaining for 
State and Municipal Employees, 26 VAND. L. R.Ev. I, 3-4 n.18 (1973). 
46. Seitz, Legal Aspects of Public School Teacher Negotiating and Participating in 
Concerted Activities, 49 MARQ. L. R.Ev. 487, 498-99 (1966). 
47. 269 S.2d 684 (Fla. 1972). 
48. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides: 
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of 
membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization. The 
right of employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collectively 
shall not be denied or abridged. Public employees shall not have the right to strike, 
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denied because the court felt that the judiciary should not compel 
the legislature to exercise a purely legislative prerogative. Neverthe-
less, the court pointed to court-ordered reapportionment plans as 
authority for the proposition that the court could act in the face of 
legislative inaction to facilitate the exercise of constitutional rights.49 
But the court refused to grant such relief, for 
[t]he Legislature, having thus entered the field, we have confidence 
that within a reasonable time it will extend its time and study into 
this field, and, therefore, judicial implementation of the rights in 
question would be premature at this time.50 
V. THE BARGAINING PROCESS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
A. The Legacy from the Private Sector 
In private sector labor relations, the duty to bargain is defined 
by section S(d) of the NLRA51 as 
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the 
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment, ... but such obligation does not compel either party to agree 
to a proposal or require the making of a concession .... 
The obligation to negotiate in good faith has been interpreted by 
the courts as requiring a duty to participate actively in deliberations 
with a sincere desire and intention to reach an agreement.52 Nor-
mally, this would encompass give and take on both sides until some 
agreement is reached, but there is no legal duty to agree. Further-
more, the NLRA does not preclude an employer from bargaining in 
good faith for unilateral control over a matter covered by the duty to 
bargain.rm Similarly, the failure to make a counter-proposal is not 
a per se violation of the NLRA;54 however, such a failure, in the 
context of the totality of a party's conduct at the bargaining table, 
may lead to the inference of bad faith bargaining.55 In essence, the 
requirement of good faith bargaining in the private sector is simply 
that both parties manifest a type of attitude and conduct which will 
be conducive to the reaching of an agreement. 
49. 269 S.2d at 687. 
50. 269 S.2d at 688. 
51. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). 
52. E.g., NLRB v. Montgomery Ward&: Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943). 
53. NLRB v. American Natl. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). 
54. NLRB v. Arkansas Rice Growers' Cooperative Assn., 400 F.2d 565, 571 (8th Cir. 
1968). 
55. NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 
965 (1970). 
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B. The Muddle of Bargaining Models in the Public Sector: 
"Meet and Confer" or "Collective Negotiations" 
Statutes concerned with public sector bargaining may be divided 
into two categories: those providing for "collective negotiations" and 
the so-called "meet and confer" statutes. In states, such as Michigan, 
which have adopted the collective-negotiations approach, the stat-
utory definition of the duty to bargain is often identical or very 
similar to that found in the NLRA.56 It is probably safe to assume 
that these statutes were intentionally designed to incorporate by 
reference private sector precedents. On this score, it is interesting to 
note that the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) 
frequently cites NLRB precedents in deciding cases under that state's 
Public Employment Relations Act.57 
Before attempting an appraisal of legislation based on the meet-
and-confer model, it may be helpful to contrast it with the collective-
negotiations approach presently recognized in the private sector. 
"Meet-and-confer negotiations" can be defined as the 
process of negotiating terms and conditions of employment intended 
to emphasize the differences between public and private employment 
conditions. Negotiations under "meet and confer" laws usually im-
ply discussions leading to unilateral adoption of policy by legislative 
body rather than written contract, and take place with multiple em-
ployee representatives rather than an exclusive bargaining agent.58 
This definition fairly describes what was originally intended by the 
meet-and-confer standard of bargaining. Implicit in the pure meet-
and-confer approach is the assumption that the private sector bar-
gaining model would be overly permissive if applied without qual-
ification to the public sector. In other words, it is argued that public 
employers should retain broad managerial discretion in the opera-
tion of a governmental agency, subject only to the recall of the 
electorate. Thus, under the pure meet-and-confer bargaining model, 
the outcome of any public employer-employee discussions will de-
pend more on management's determinations than on bilateral deci-
sions by "equals" at the bargaining table. In contrast, the parties in 
the private sector meet as equals and are free to negotiate to a point 
of impasse all "mandatory" subjects of bargaining-matters concern-
ing wages, hours, and conditions of employment.59 
56. See, e.g., MrcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.215 (1967); P.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, 
§ ll0l.701 (Supp. 1972). 
57. See, e.g., Westwood Community Schools, 7 Michigan Employment Relations 
Commission Labor Opinions [hereinafter MERC Lab. Op.] 913 (1972). 
58. GERR REFER.ENCE FILE 91:02-03 (1970). 
59. The parties, however. may not insist that "permissible" subjects be bargained 
upon. See text accompanying notes 108-09 infra. 
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It is generally assumed that most states which have passed statutes 
dealing with public sector labor relations have opted for the collec-
tive-negotiations model over the meet-and-confer approach. Close 
study of the legislation, however, reveals that this conclusion appears 
to be somewhat overdrawn and, at best, misleading. Actually, most 
states have rejected the pure meet-and-confer bargaining model, but, 
by the same token, most have also rejected the collective-negotiations 
approach. In practice, most states have adopted either a modified 
meet-and-confer statute, which gives unions more bargaining power 
than the pure model, or a modified collective-negotiations statute, 
which is more restrictive from the union's viewpoint than its private 
sector counterpart. For this reason alone, it is often difficult to dis-
tinguish between meet-and-confer and collective-negotiations as via-
ble working concepts in the public sector. 
Most critics of meet-and-confer have argued that any bargaining 
structure which relegates the employees' representative to the status 
of a "conferee" or "discussant," rather than a negotiator, is patently 
deficient. But this criticism rests on the assumption that the bargain-
ing process is in fact different under a meet-and-confer, as opposed 
to a collective-negotiations, model. However, the recent history of 
collective bargaining in the public sector suggests that there is rela-
tively little difference in bargaining tactics or techniques under these 
two models. Unions in the public sector have pressed for the same 
type of demands and with the same vigor under both models. More-
over, many of the states which have passed meet-and-confer statutes 
have so distorted the pure meet-and-confer bargaining model that 
it is no longer accurate to say that the parties governed by these 
statutes do not meet as "equals." 
At last count, seven states-Alabama, California, Idaho, Kansas, 
Missouri, Montana, and Oregon-had some form of meet-and-confer 
legislation covering various groups of government employees.00 Of 
these, only Missouri, Alabama, and California have statutes that 
embody the pure meet-and-confer approach. For example, as the 
Supreme Court of Missouri ruled in Missey v. City of Cabool,61 the 
Missouri statute does 
not purport to give to public employees the right of collective bar-
60. ALA. CoDE tit. 37, § 450(3) (Supp. 1969); CAL. EDuc. CoDE §§ 13080-90 (West 
1969), as amended, (West Supp. 1972) (Winton Act-teachers); CAL. Govr. CODE§§ 3525-
36 (West Supp. 1972) (state employees); CAL. Govr. CODE §§ 3500-ll (West 1966), as 
amended, (West Supp. 1972) (Meyers-Milias-Brown Act-other public employees); 
lDAHo CoDE §§ 44-1801 to -18ll (Supp. 1971): KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-4321 to -4335 
(Supp. 1972); Mo. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.500-.530 (Supp. 1973); MONT. R.Ev. CODES ANN. 
§§ 75-6ll5 to -6128 (1971); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 342.440-.480, 342,710-.780 (1971). 
61. 441 S.W .2d 35 (Mo. 1969). 
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gaining guaranteed ... to employees in private industry . . .. The 
act does not constitute a delegation ... to the union of the legisla-
tive power of the public body, and therefore ... the prior discretion 
in the legislative body to adopt, modify or reject outright the results 
of the discussions is untouched ...• The act provides only a proce-
dure for communication between the organization selected by pub-
lic employees and their employer without requiring adoption of any 
agreement reached.62 
The recently enacted statute covering state employees in California 
seems to follow the principles espoused in Missey, for it simply re-
quires the state representatives to "meet and confer" with employee 
representatives upon request, and to "consider," as fully as is deemed 
reasonable by the government representative, presentations made by 
the employee representative. The statute clearly indicates that after 
the state has reasonably "considered" union proposals, it may then 
act unilaterally with respect to wages, hours, and conditions of em-
ployment. 63 
While it is plain that in some states, the parties do not meet as 
equals at the bargaining table, there are other meet-and-confer juris-
dictions in which the matter has not been so neatly resolved. In 
Kansas, for example, the duty to meet and confer encompasses more 
than a mere exhortation to the public employer to "consider" em-
ployees' proposals; it is a mutual obligation to "meet and confer in 
order ... to endeavor to reach agreement on conditions of employ-
ment."64 Other meet-and-confer statutes state even more explicitly 
that the employer's duty goes beyond listening to its employees' 
suggestions. For example, the Montana statute makes it an unfair 
labor practice for a government employer to refuse to "meet, confer, 
or negotiate in good faith." 65 
The concept of meeting and conferring in good faith has been 
supported by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela-
62. 441 S."W .2d at 41. 
63. CAL. Govr. CODE§§ 3525-36 (West Supp. 1972). The act governing teacher nego-
tiations exprwly provides that the final decision is to be made by the public school 
employer. CAL. Eouc. CODE § 13088 (West Supp. 1972). Cf. Torrance Educ. Assn. v. 
Board of Educ., 21 Cal. App. 2d 589, 98 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971). 
64. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4322(1) (Supp. 1972) (emphasis added). In contrast to the 
situation in pure meet-and-confer states, the Kansas public employer cannot implement 
proposals unilateraIIy upon reaching impasse. At impasse the Kansas statute calls for 
mediation, fact-finding with recommendations, and voluntary arbitration. KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 75-4382 (Supp. 1972). Thus, whatever differences may exist between the duty 
to meet and confer as it exists in Kansas and the duty to bargain collectively prior 
to impasse, the Kansas procedure on reaching impasse is virtually identical to pro-
cedures established in some collective-negotiations states. E.g., HAWAII REv. STAT.§ 89-11 
(Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.69(1), 179.72(9)-(11) (Supp. 1973); N.Y. Civ. SERV. 
LAW § 209 (McKinney 1973). 
65. MoNT. REv. CODE'S ANN. § 75-6120 (1971) (emphasis added). 
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tions (ACIR). In a lengthy report, the Commission opted for a modi-
fied meet-and-confer approach, which it explained as follows: 
"In good faith" has a number of important connotations as it ap-
plies to the meet and confer process. It obligates the governmental 
employer and a recognized employee organization to approach the 
discussion table with an open mind. It underscores the fact that such 
meetings should be held at mutually agreeable and convenient times. 
It recognizes that a sincere effort should be made by both parties to 
reach agreement on all matters falling properly within the discus-
sions' purview. It signifies that both sides will be represented by duly 
authorized spokesmen prepared to confer on all such matters .... It 
calls for a free exchange to the other party, on request, of non-con-
fidential data pertinent to any issues under discussion. It implies a 
joint effort in drafting a non-binding memorandum of understand-
ing setting forth all agreed upon recommendations for submission 
to the jurisdiction's appropriate governing officials. It charges the 
governmental agent to strive to achieve acceptance and implemen-
tation of these recommendations by such officials. It affirms that fail-
ure to reach agreement or to make concessions does not constitute 
bad faith when real differences of opinion exist. It requires both 
parties to be receptive to mediation if bona fide differences of opin-
ion produce an impasse. Finally, it means that the State public labor-
management relations law should list as an unfair practice failure 
to meet and confer in good faith, thereby providing a basis for legal 
recourse.66 
It is noteworthy that the ACIR recommendations, which have 
been followed by some states, include the suggestion that the parties 
may be required to bargain in "good faith" to a point of impasse. 
Surely, if this is a part of the definition of meet and confer, then the 
bargaining process is not much different from the collective-negotia-
tions approach. 
The apparent distinction between the ACIR modified meet-and-
confer approach and the traditional collective-negotiations approach 
is the ACIR suggestion that the result of bargaining should be "a 
non-binding memorandum of understanding setting forth all agreed 
upon recommendations for submission to the jurisdiction's appro-
priate governing officials." But the requirement of a conditional 
agreement does not really distinguish the modified meet-and-confer 
states from some states which have followed the collective-negotia-
tions model. Under the New York Taylor Act, 67 it is provided that 
any labor agreement between a public employer and a union must 
66 • .ADVISORY CoMMN. ON !NTERGOVERNllf:ENTAL RELAUONS, LABOR·MANAGE:\IENT POL· 
ICIES FOR STATE & LoCAL GoVERNME?-.'TS 102 (1969). 
67. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW§§ 200-14 (McKinney 1973). 
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include, "in type not smaller than the largest type used elsewhere 
in the agreement," the following clause: 
It is agreed ... that any provision of this agreement requiring legis-
lative action to permit its implementation by amendment of law or 
by providing the additional funds therefor, shall not become effec-
tive until the appropriate legislative body has given approval.68 
Thus, even in New York, which has one of the most comprehensive 
collective-negotiations statutes, the end product of bargaining may 
be nothing more than a conditional agreement.69 
The curious mixture of statutory schemes used to define the duty 
to bargain in the public sector probably just reflects the initial 
reluctance of state legislatures to adopt the private sector bargaining 
model in toto. However, some of this legislative reticence is begin-
ning to mellow. Minnesota and Alaska recently shunned meet-and-
confer language in newly adopted statutes,70 and the word "nego-
tiate" was recently substituted for the word "confer" in the South 
Dakota statute.71 
C. The Varying Bargaining Rights for Different Classes 
of Public Employees 
In the preceding discussion of how the bargaining process varies 
from state to state, it has been assumed that each state has adopted 
the same bargaining procedures for all public employees. Actually, 
some state legislatures have grouped public employees into several 
classes for the purposes of defining bargaining rights, and each class 
tends to be burdened with its own restrictions. For example, the 
scope of state employee bargaining is often restricted in deference 
to pre-existing civil service laws.72 In the case of municipal em-
ployees, a concern for home rule has produced some statutes that 
cover municipal employees only at local option.73 In addition to state 
and municipal employees, other groups, such as policemen and fire-
men, teachers, and miscellaneous employees (nurses, noncertificated 
68. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 204-a(l) (McKinney 1973). 
69. See also text accompanying notes 99-101 infra. 
70. A.LA.s. STAT. §§ 23.40.070-.260 (1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.61-.77 (Supp. 1973). 
71. S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 3-18-2 (Supp. 1972). 
72. CAL. GOVT. CoDE §§ 3500 (West 1966), 3525 (West Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 75-4330 (Supp. 1972); ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 969 (Supp. 1972); MAss. ANN. 
LAws ch. 149, § 1781 (Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.703 (Supp. 1972); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 905 (1972); WASH. R.Ev. CODE § 41.56.100 (1969); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ lll.91(2)(b) (Supp. 1973). 
73. E.g., CAL. Go\T. CoDE §§ 3500-11 (West 1966), as amended, (West Supp. 1972); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-4321 to -4335 (Supp. 1972); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 243.711-.795 (1971). 
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employees of school districts, etc.) are frequently singled out for spe-
cial treatment. 
The class of public employees most often differentiated from the 
others is teachers. As noted hereafter, some state statutes reflect the 
view that certain professional employees-administrators, techni-
cians, and scientists, but primarily teachers-are valuable resource 
personnel and that they should therefore be available for consulta-
tion on policy matters, in a nonadversary situation, lest their exper-
tise be lost to the public employer. As a consequence, some statutes 
not only seek to protect the right of these employees to bargain with 
respect to what are traditionally viewed as mandatory subjects of 
bargaining, but also preserve for these employees the right to discuss 
other matters which, absent statutory provisions, would be either 
wholly within the discretion of the public employer or not a manda-
tory subject of bargaining. Under the new Minnesota public em-
ployee relations statute,74 for example, all public employees have the 
right to "meet and negotiate" with respect to terms and conditions 
of employment,75 while "professional employees" have the addi-
tional right to "meet and confer" . . . over items not defined as 
"terms and conditions of employment."76 Minnesota is unique in 
its bifurcation of the duty to bargain in a single statute. Several 
other states have separate statutes designed to narrow the scope of 
bargaining for professionals so as to avoid adversary confrontations 
on policy issues. 71 
The type of bargaining authorized for teachers is often given the 
name "professional negotiations." However, the use of this term may 
be meaningless as a practical matter. For example, in the Kansas 
statute applying to teachers,78 "professional negotiations" has vir-
tually the same meaning as does the modified meet-and-confer obliga-
tion, discussed above,79 which covers other public employees. Simi-
larly, in Vermont, "professional negotiations" is defined to mean 
"meeting, conferring, consulting, discussing and negotiating."80 Thus 
the term may merely reflect the attempts by some state legislatures 
to avoid traditional collective bargaining in situations involving 
professional employees. 
74. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.61-.77 (Supp. 1973). 
75. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 179.65(4) (Supp. 1973). 
76. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.65(3), 179.73 (Supp. 1973). 
77. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-1278 to -1295 (Supp. 1969); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 342.440-
.480 (1971 ). 
78. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5413 to -5425 (Supp. 1972). 
79. See note 64 supra and accompanying text. 
80. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1981(2) (Supp. 1972) (emphasis added). 
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The trend in state legislation away from the initial flirtation with 
meet-and-confer is not yet complete. Even as they amend legislation 
to conform more generally to the dominant collective-negotiations 
model, some state legislatures continue to cling to the notion that 
there ought to be some differences between the public and private 
sectors with respect to the nature of the duty to bargain. It is not 
clear, however, that legislative attempts to preserve the remnants 
of a limited bargaining model in the context of over-all liberaliza• 
tion will have any practical effect on the behavior of the parties at 
the bargaining table. 
D. Exclusive Representation 
As part of the liberalizing trend with respect to the bargaining 
process, most states now accept the principle of exclusive representa-
tion. However, one state supreme court has held that exclusive 
representation violates the employee's right to refrain from joining a 
union.81 The only other major exception to the exclusive representa-
tion principle is the California Winton Act82 (covering public school 
teachers), which provides for proportional representation of em-
ployee groups through "negotiating councils." The California court 
of appeals has held in two cases that employee groups may not be 
recognized or negotiate except through these councils.83 But even in 
California there is movement away from proportional representa-
tion; the exclusive representation principle has been incorporated 
in recent amendments to the Meyers-Millias-Brown Act,84 which 
applies to local employees. 
E. The Impact of the "Sunshine Laws" 
An interesting problem with respect to the process of bargaining 
results from the conflict of the government's duty to conduct business 
openly with the practical requirement that collective bargaining 
discussions be conducted with some privacy. In Florida, for example, 
the so-called "Sunshine Law"85 requires that all meetings of state 
agencies be open to the public. Thus, in Bassett v. Braddock,86 the 
Florida supreme court was faced with the question of whether a 
81. Dade County Classroom Teachers' Assn. v. Ryan, 225 S.2d 903 (Fla. 1969). 
82. CAL. EDuc. CoDE §§ 13080-88 (West 1969), as amended, (West Supp. 1972). 
8!!. West Valley Fedn. of Teachers v. Campbell Union High School Dist., 24 Cal. 
App. 3d 297, 101 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1972); California Fedn. of Teachers v. Oxnard Elemen-
tary Schools, 272 Cal. App. 2d 514, 77 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1969). 
84. CAL. Govr. CoDE §§ 3500-11 (West 1966), as amended, (West Supp. 1972). 
85. FLA STAT. ANN. § 286.0ll (Supp. 1972). 
86. 262 S.2d 425 {Fla. 1972). 
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negotiator for a county board of education could participate in pri-
vate negotiations with representatives of a teachers' union without 
violating the Sunshine Law. The court determined that technical 
compliance with the law was achieved when the board, at a public 
meeting, voted on and approved, with modifications, the negotiator's 
recommendations. In holding that the law did not apply to prelim-
inary deliberations and discussions, the court sustained the view of 
the Dade County circuit court that "meaningful collective bargain-
ing in the circumstances here would be destroyed if full publicity 
were accorded at each step of the negotiations."87 
Even if preliminary negotiations may be held in secret, laws 
requiring public employers to conduct public meetings raise another 
interesting question: Must a public employer allow the representa-
tive of a minority union to make a presentation at a public meeting, 
and, if so, does this constitute unlawful "negotiating" with a minor-
ity representative in derogation of the rights of the exclusive repre-
sentative? The Wisconsin supreme court dealt with this issue in 
Board of School Directors v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Com-
mission.88 The court held that such a presentation, if made on behalf 
of a minority organization, did constitute unlawful "negotiating." 
Under the school board's regulations a minority-union representative 
87. 262 S.2d at 426. "Sunshine" or "right-to-know" laws are not universal. Where 
they do exist, reconciliation between the open meeting principle and collective bar-
gaining is usually achieved without a court battle. For example, according to the 
Massachusetts attorney general, that state's "right-to-know" law, MASS. ANN. LAws 
ch. 39, § 23A (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971), does not apply to collective bargaining 
sessions. [1967-1968] MAss. ATrY. GEN. REP. 92. 
In Wisconsin, the attorney general has stated: 
Whether the teacher salary proposals submitted by the teachers' committee 
and the counter proposals made by the school board are preliminary in nature 
and for bargaining reasons need to be discussed in a closed session is basically a 
question of fact to be decided by the school board. If the board finds that the bar-
gaining process can best be carried on in private, the meeting may be closed .••• 
[However,] [w]hen the bargaining period is past, no final action should be taken 
on the teachers' salary schedule until they are [sic] made public and discussed in 
an open public meeting. 
1965 WIS. ATrY. GEN. OP. at vi. 
California's open-meeting statute, CAL. GoVT. CODE §§ 54950-60 (West 1966), as 
amended, (West Supp. 1972), provides that secret meetings can be held under certain 
circumstances. And in New York, the Commissioner of Education determined as 
early as 1951 that school boards would be permitted to hold executive sessions so long 
as official actions were taken only at regular sessions. D. WoLI.E'IT &: R. CHANIN, THE 
LAW AND PRAcnCE OF TEACHER NEGOTIATIONS 4:3-4 (1970). While the relation between 
open-meeting statutes and collective bargaining is still cloudy in some areas, the Florida 
experience appears unlikely to be repeated with any great frequency elsewhere. 
For discussions of the constitutional dimensions of sunshine laws, see generally 
Parks, The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right To Know Under the Con-
stitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1957); Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press 
Fights for the "Right To Know," 75 HARV. L. REv. 1199, 1200-03 (1962). 
88. 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W .2d 92 (1969). 
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could speak on his own behalf, though not in his representative 
capacity; thus, the court managed to sidestep the troublesome free 
speech and right-of-petition questions which might flow from a public 
employer's unyielding refusal to hear third-party public expressions 
concerning a pending negotiation. 
In September 1972, the Wisconsin Employment Relations Com-
mission (WERC) confronted this issue in a more direct fashion. In 
Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Joint School District No. 8,89 WERC 
held that the Madison board of education violated its duty to bargain 
when it heard a minority representative who addressed a public 
meeting of the board concerning a "fair-share" (agency shop) agree-
ment, which was being negotiated by the board and the majority 
union. WERC ruled that the board was not entitled to hear argu-
ments against fair-share agreements until after a specific agreement 
had been negotiated and only the question of the acceptance of the 
negotiated agreement by the employees remained. The Commission 
specifically rejected the contention that this constituted a denial of 
the minority representative's constitutional rights. The board, it 
said, had other ways to receive the information presented by the 
minority representative without violating its duty to bargain, includ-
ing hearing presentations at times other than during negotiations 
with the exclusive representative of the unit. This decision is con-
sistent with a fundamental principle of labor relations: in order to 
gain the rights associated with exclusive representation, employees 
must accept limitations on other rights, including the right to nego-
tiate with the employer individually or through representatives of 
employee groups other than the one chosen by a majority of em-
ployees.00 
F. Determining Who the Public "Employer" Is: The Impact 
of the Political Process 
Questions relating to the exclusive representation principle and 
the impact of the Sunshine Laws pale by comparison to the problem 
of attempting to identify the real public "employer" in any given 
public sector negotiations.91 Should the executive branch, which has 
over-all responsibility for the bureaucracy, be designated as the em-
89. GERR No. 483, at B-3 (Case VIII, No. 15210 MP-107, Dec. No. ll271, Sept. 13, 
1972). 
90. See, e.g., NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216 (1969). See generall)' 
Oldham, Organized Labor, the Environment, and the Taft-Hartley Act, 71 MICH. L. 
REV. 935, 1010-17 (1973). 
91. See Blair, supra note 45, at 8-10. 
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ployer? Or does that title belong to the legislature, which appropriates 
the money and approves the financial terms of contracts? What role 
should the personnel division of a civil service system play? 
These questions take on great practical importance when the 
state statute provides sanctions for a refusal to bargain in good faith. 
One element of good faith bargaining is the presence of bargaining 
representatives on both sides of the negotiating table who have the 
authority to make genuine proposals. Of course, final authority need 
not be possessed by negotiators for either side; for example, it is an 
accepted practice in the private sector for union representatives to 
submit a contract for final ratification by the membership before 
execution. A different situation, however, is faced by public em-
ployees when the representative of the public employer lacks even 
the authority to arrive at a conditional agreement. Absent a statute 
clearly identifying the participants on the public employer's side 
of the bargaining table, the question must be resolved on a case-by-
case basis. A public employee relations board could serve a vital 
function in this area, by shaping the collective bargaining process 
through unfair labor practice proceedings.92 
A good example of the usefulness of the case-by-case method of 
establishing the identity of the employer is seen in Typographical 
Union v. Personnel Division,93 decided by the Oregon Public Em-
ployee Relations Board (PERB). When the state personnel division 
refused to recommend approval of the wage adjustments called for 
in a joint agreement between state printing trade employees and the 
state printer, an unfair labor practice charge was filed. Even though 
a contract approved by the personnel division would still be subject 
92. Resolution of bargaining disputes by an administrative body such as a public 
employment relations board is preferable to resolution by the courts for two reasons. 
First, the procedure is usually speedier and less expensive, and the law, therefore, tends 
to develop faster. The speed with which disputes are resolved is more important in 
labor relations than in ordinary civil proceedings, for a labor-management dispute, 
unlike the typical civil action, is only part of an ongoing relation. Moreover, speedy 
resolution is desirable not only to settle current disputes and avoid the disruption and 
disharmony resulting from such actions as strikes, lockouts, and boycotts, but also to 
clarify the rights of the parties with respect to their future dealings. 
A second reason in favor of using public employment relation boards to resolve 
disputes is that members of these boards are often experts in labor relations. As 
specialists who are constantly dealing with various facets of their specialty, they are 
better prepared to deal with the concepts that they are expected to apply than are 
judges, who are often without any labor relations expertise and who deal with labor 
cases only sporadically. Labor relations, especially in the public sector, involves public 
policy considerations as well as technical questions of law. But the role of the courts 
in resolving public policy questions in this area is better preserved in judicial review 
of administrative proceedings than in providing an initial forum, 
93. GERR No. 400, at B-6 (Case No. C-39, March 31, 1971). For a discussion of this 
case in the context of delegation of power and scope of bargaining problems, see Blair, 
supra note 45, at 11-15. 
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to final approval by the governor and the making of the necessary 
appropriations by the legislature, the Oregon PERB held that the 
personnel division should have participated in the bargaining process 
rather than waiting to reject the completed agreement, because the 
state, as well as the state agencies, is a "public employer" by definition 
under the Oregon statute.94 
The Oregon Board quite properly took a functional approach 
in defining the relation between the employees and the component 
parts of the employer's authority structure. The Board stressed that 
"individuals engaged in the actual bargaining process must be per-
sons empowered to present the facts ... in support of their own posi-
tion and to weigh and evaluate the arguments ... presented by their 
colleagues across the table."95 The fact that the Oregon statute 
contemplates only a conditional agreement did not, in the Board's 
view, eliminate the employer's obligation to develop a bargaining 
approach common to all elements of the bureaucracy having an 
input into the process. The Board noted specifically that "[t]here is 
nothing to prevent the parties from negotiating to a point at which 
the governor has either accepted or not accepted a proffered agree-
ment."06 
Only recently has a state legislature addressed itself to the 
problem of identifying the employer of state employees. The revised 
Wisconsin statute provides that "the state shall be considered as a 
single employer ... [and that] [i]t is the responsibility of the execu-
tive branch to negotiate collective bargaining agreements, and to 
administer such agreements. . . .''97 The statute also spells out the 
responsibility for the handling of employer functions within the 
executive branch and for the coordination of collective bargaining 
activities.98 Finally, the Wisconsin law makes it clear that the legis-
lature must take specific steps to approve or disapprove those portions 
of agreements which require legislative action.99 Statutes of this type 
should help to eliminate the frustration and waste of time and money 
which occur in those all-too-frequent instances where a union con-
cludes an agreement only to find that it has been dealing with an 
agency with insufficient authority to negotiate effectively. 
While the Wisconsin statute states in detail the tasks that the 
Wisconsin legislature must perform in public sector bargaining, it 
94. ORE, REV. STAT. § 243.711(5) (1971). 
95. GERR No. 400, at B-7. 
96. GERR No. 400, at B-7. 
97. Wrs. STAT. ANN. § lll.81(16) (Supp. 1973). 
98. Wrs. STAT. ANN.§§ 111.80(4), 111.81(16) (Supp. 1973). 
99. Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 111.92 (Supp. 1973). 
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also brings out the fact that the role of the legislature in the bar-
gaining process is conceptually ambiguous, absent a statute. On the 
one hand, the state legislature, or its equivalent in a political sub-
division, although it is the final legitimating authority, at least for 
fiscal matters, is wholly outside the negotiating process, which is 
completed before the legislature is called upon to act. On the other 
hand, the need for legislative approval necessarily affects the bar-
gaining process. For example, the bargaining position of the em-
ployer is likely to be strengthened if the parties believe that the 
legislature will not approve settlements beyond a certain percentage 
or dollar increase over present benefits. 
The Wisconsin statute provides an example of how the legislature 
may not only legitimate public sector contracts, but also participate 
more directly in the bargaining process. It requires that agreements, 
once approved by the unions involved, be approved by a joint 
legislative committee. The committee then introduces bills in both 
houses to implement those portions of the agreement, such as wage 
adjustments and fringe benefits, which require legislative approval. 
If the committee rejects the agreement, or the legislature rejects 
the resultant bills, the agreement is sent back to the parties for 
renegotiation.100 Thus, the parties must remain aware of the atti-
tudes of both the legislative committee and the legislature itself.101 
Participation by the legislature in the bargaining process raises 
the question whether a legislative body can be regarded as the 
"employer." The legislature, as approving authority, is a part of the 
same government as the executive branch, which acts as the negoti-
ating authority. May the executive be regarded as the "agent" of the 
legislature, in the sense that it has actual authority to negotiate 
only those contracts which the legislature will approve? Should the 
executive be charged with actual or constructive knowledge of legis-
lative tolerance limits, and should both the executive and the legis-
lature be subject to unfair labor practice charges if the executive 
negotiates a contract knowing the legislature will disapprove it? 
These interesting questions were raised with respect to a local 
legislative body in a recent decision by the New York Public Employ-
ment Relations Board. In Board of Trustees of the Ulster County 
100. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.92(1) (Supp. 1973). 
101. In this respect, the role of the Wisconsin legislature is to be contrasted with 
that of its New York counterpart. The provision of the Taylor Law requiring legislative 
approval of the negotiated contract, N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAw § 204-a(l) (McKinney 1973), 
involves a significantly lower level of legislative participation in the process than the 
Wisconsin statute provides. 
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Community College,102 the college board of trustees agreed to a wage 
hike in excess of the maximum raise authorized by the county legis-
lature. The legislature then repudiated the authority of the trustees 
and sought to renegotiate the contract. The hearing officer found that 
the trustees had in fact exceeded their authority; however, he found 
that the legislature had committed an improper practice in re-
nouncing the authority of the board and rejecting the contract. By 
reference to agency principles, the hearing officer determined that 
the act of the agent (the trustees) should be attributed to the prin-
cipal (the legislature) where the agent is clothed with apparent 
authority to negotiate an agreement. This finding of an improper 
practice was rejected by the New York PERB, on the ground that an 
agent should be free to agree to a proposal in excess of his authority 
if he has the good faith belief that his principal may be persuaded to 
agree also. The decision by the Board did not reject the agency con-
cept, however, and left open the possibility that the Board may return 
in later cases to the view expressed by the hearing officer that where 
a legislative body directly involves itself in the negotiating process, 
such action is reviewable by the Board and may be the subject of an 
improper practice proceeding. In an earlier New York decision, in 
which the legislative body did involve itself in the negotiating 
process, a hearing officer ruled that only the executive branch could 
be charged with an improper practice since only that branch, and 
not the corresponding legislature, actually "negotiates."103 
The Ulster County Community College case dealt with the role 
of a local legislative body in the bargaining process. Different ques-
tions are raised when dealing with state legislatures. County and 
municipal governments, even where "home rule" statutes grant con-
siderable freedom of action to localities, are agencies of the state, 
subject to the superior authority of the state government.104 State 
courts, therefore, have more freedom to evaluate the behavior of local 
legislative bodies according to the dictates of state law than they have 
to challenge the state legislature on its own ground. Attribution of 
"employer" status to the state legislature for the purpose of enforcing 
its own laws against itself is unlikely. But the fact that the legis-
lature may not be a designated participant in the bargaining process 
does not alter the reality of its influence on that process. 
102. 4 New York Public Employment Relations Board (hereinafter N.Y. PERBJ 
4639 (1971) (hearing officer's decision); 4 N.Y. PERB 3749 (1971) (board decision). 
103. Town of Huntington, 3 N.Y. PERB 4501 (1970). 
104. E. STASON 8: P. ~UPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TIIE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPO· 
RATIONS 2 (3d ed. 1959). 
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Clearly, the nature of government requires that adjustments be 
made in adapting private sector patterns to public sector negotia-
tions. But these adjustments need not require a wholly different 
approach to the process. One major problem at present is simply 
definitional-deciding who the proper parties to the negotiations 
actually are in any given case. Solutions will come in time through 
statutory clarification and ad hoc determinations. 
A second major problem-the requirement of legislative ap-
proval of fiscal matters-is one to which the parties themselves can 
adjust, just as employers in the private sector have adjusted to the 
fact that a contract normally is not final until ratified by the union 
membership. Statutory provisions such as those found in New York 
and Wisconsin should help the parties to remain aware of the need 
for such an adjustment. 
VI. THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING 
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that there are 
numerous troublesome issues yet to be resolved concerning the 
process of collective bargaining in the public sector. While these 
issues are not insignificant, more important are the questions related 
to the range of legally permissible subjects about which the parties 
may meet and confer or negotiate in the public sector. If, as herein-
above suggested, there is no real difference in the technique of bar-
gaining under most meet-and-confer and collective-negotiations laws, 
then the crucial inquiry must involve the scope of bargaining under 
either approach. And even if the process of bargaining differs be-
tween meet-and-confer and collective-negotiations states (because the 
parties negotiate as "equals" only under the latter approach), we are 
still not told much about the effective scope of bargaining in the 
states which have opted for the collective-negotiations approach. A 
state statutory requirement that the parties negotiate as "equals" will 
be insignificant if the statute also narrowly limits the scope of bar-
gaining. To promise the government employee equality at the 
bargaining table while at the same time excluding most items relating 
to wages, hours, and working conditions from the mandatory subjects 
of bargaining would make collective bargaining for the public sector 
an illusory gain indeed. 
A. "Mandatory" and "Permissive" Subjects 
In the private sector, the scope of bargaining is derived from the 
words "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," 
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found in section 8(d) of the NLRA.105 Subjects covered by this 
phrase are deemed to be mandatory, and the employer must bargain 
with respect to them.100 Other matters are either permissive or 
illegal subjects of bargaining.107 Bargaining with respect to per-
missive subjects is discretionary for both parties,1°8 and neither is 
required to bargain in good faith to the point at which agreement or 
impasse is reached.109 The parties are not explicitly forbidden from 
discussing matters which are illegal subjects of bargaining, but a 
contract provision embodying an illegal subject is, of course, un-
enforceable. 110 
In the public sector, the NLRA language is frequently incor-
porated in state statutes to establish the broad outlines of the scope 
of bargaining. State courts and public employment relations boards 
have likewise frequently relied upon the mandatory-permissive-illegal 
distinction, although the distinction probably has little relevance in 
the pure meet-and-confer states, where the employer's duty to con-
sider any proposal is not very great. The public sector differs greatly 
from the private sector, however, in the method by which this 
distinction is delineated. In the private sector, the line between 
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining is drawn on an ad 
hoc basis, as the NLRB and the courts subject the distinction to 
constant redefinition and refinement. In the public sector, there is 
an attempt to accomplish much more by statute, generally in the form 
of specific restrictions on the subject matter of bargaining. In some 
cases, state statutes exclude specific matters from the category of 
105. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). 
106. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). 
107. Normally, the courts and the NLRB have held that unless a subject is likely 
to have a significant impact on the job rights and security of an employee, it will not 
be covered by the duty to bargain. Indeed, some "business decisions" are not covered 
by the duty to bargain even though they may have a real impact on employees' job 
interests. E.g., UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Adams Dairy, 
Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966). However, the effect 
of a business decision-such as a decision to move a plant operation or to contract out 
bargaining unit work-on employees may be held to be negotiable. E.g., General Motors 
Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 77 LR.R.M. 1537 (1971), petition for review denied sub 
nom. UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
108. NLRB v. American Natl. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). 
109. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). At least one 
state has adopted this rule in the public sector as well. In Mayor Samuel E. Zoll, GERR 
No. 485, at B-5 (Case No. MUP-309, Dec. 14, 1972), the Massachusetts Labor Relations 
Commission held that the city's insistence on "public view" bargaining as a precondi-
tion to agreement was a failure to bargain in good faith. See note 87 supra for a 
discussion of the applicability of the Massachusetts "right-to-know" law. See also Town 
of Stratford, Dec. No. 1069 (Conn. St. Bd. Lab. Rel., May 26, 1972), discussed in note 
151 infra. 
110. NLRB v. National Maritime Union, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949). 
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mandatory subjects of bargaining;111 presumably, however, these 
matters are still bargainable on a permissive basis. In other cases, 
public employers are forbidden altogether from bargaining about 
certain listed subjects.112 In Wisconsin, the State Employment Labor 
Relations Act contains both types of restrictions.113 
B. The Impact of Pre-Existing Legislation and 
Civil Service Laws 
Other statutory provisions restrict the scope of bargaining by 
giving precedence to pre-existing state law or municipal ordinance 
over a subsequent collective bargaining agreement. For example, the 
Massachusetts municipal employee bargaining statute provides: "In 
the event that any part or provision of any such agreement is in 
conflict with any law, ordinance, or by-law, such law, ordinance, or 
by-law shall prevail so long as such conflict remains . . . ."114 Par-
ticularly important among pre-existing laws which may conflict with 
collective bargaining agreements are civil service statutes and regu-
lations. Nine statutes in eight states apparently give precedence to 
civil service systems over collective bargaining agreements.1115 In two 
states the collective bargaining agreement is given precedence.116 In 
Michigan, where the public employee bargaining statute117 makes no 
mention of precedence, the state supreme court has ruled that those 
provisions of local civil service laws covering mandatory subjects 
of bargaining are superseded pro tanto by the Michigan Public Em-
ployees Relations Act.118 Whether this ruling will influence other 
states where the statutes do not contain a rule of precedence remains 
to be seen. 
Arguably, of course, a rule of precedence deals with the enforce-
ment of the· completed agreement and not with the scope of bar-
gaining per se. But such a rule certainly has an impact on the scope 
of bargaining. It may seriously impair the bargaining process if the 
111. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Supp. 1972). 
112. E.g., HAWAII R.Ev. STAT. § 89-9(d) (Supp. 1971). 
113. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.90, lll.91(2)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1973). 
114. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 1781 (Supp. 1972). 
115. CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 3500 (West 1966), 3525 (West Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 75-4330 (Supp. 1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 969 (Supp. 1972); MAss. ANN. 
LAws ch. 149, § 1781 (Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.703 (Supp. 1972); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 905 (1972); WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.100 (1969); WIS. STAT. ANN, 
§ lll.91(2)(b) (Supp. 1973). 
116. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-467 to .477 (1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 89,I to -20 
(Supp. 1971). 
117. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.201-.216 (1967). 
118. Civil Serv. Commn. v. Wayne County Bd. of Supervisors, 384 Mich. 363, 184 
N.W.2d 201 (1971). 
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public employer believes that certain subjects in issue are not 
"mandatory" items covered by the duty to bargain. In other words, 
a public employer presumably will seek to avoid bargaining over 
matters covered by civil service laws, especially if inundated with a 
host of other union demands, on the plausible ground that any agree-
ments reached in these areas would be unenforceable because of con-
flicting civil service rules. 
Problems associated with the duty to bargain in the public sector 
are already too numerous to be compounded by overly broad and 
inconsistent civil service regulations. While the civil service system 
was originally designed to favor workers by eliminating patronage 
and rewarding merit, it has gradually expanded to a point where 
many systems now cover other aspects of employee relations not 
essentially related to the merit principle. In other words, the civil 
service system for many years filled the gap caused by the lack of 
public sector bargaining. Now that this gap has been filled, a con-
flict has arisen between the civil service system and the duty to 
bargain in the public sector. It is fairly clear that if the collective 
bargaining process is going to have any value at all, the civil service 
system in its broad expanded form must yield to bargaining. Thus, 
it may well be that civil service should control, at the utmost, only 
hiring, promotions, and demotions. 
Civil service laws are not the only source of conflict with collective 
bargaining legislation. Of the other statutes which limit the scope of 
bargaining, the most interesting, in view of recent developments in 
Michigan, are the municipal "home rule" statutes. A tug-of-war has 
recently developed between the Michigan courts and the Michigan 
Employment Relations Commission over the extent to which mu-
nicipal residency requirements, passed pursuant to the state's Home 
Rule Cities Act,119 can restrict the scope of mandatory bargaining. 
A number of Michigan cities, including Detroit and Pontiac, have 
passed ordinances requiring certain city employees to reside within 
the city limits. The principal opposition to these ordinances has 
come from police officers, and local police officers' associations have 
placed the ordinances high on their priority lists for negotiations 
with city officials. The issue has thus been joined: the right of 
municipalities to require a commitment to the city on the part of 
certain employees is pitted against the right of those employees to 
attempt to negotiate a relaxation of that commitment. 
In 1970, the Michigan Employment Relations Commission first 
dealt with the home rule statute, in City of Flint (Hurley Hospi-
119. MICH, Co:MP, LAws ANN, §§ 117.1-.38 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1972). 
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tal),120 holding that home rule charter provisions which outlined a 
uniform pay plan did not relieve the city of the duty to bargain over 
wages. The following year, in City of Detroit (DPOA),121 MERC 
held that the institution of a residency requirement for current em-
ployees was a mandatory subject of bargaining. In the meantime, the 
Michigan supreme court, apparently without considering the effect 
of its decisions on collective bargaining, was hearing challenges to 
the constitutionality of such residency requirements. In Williams v. 
Detroit Civil Service Commission122 and Detroit Police Officers Asso-
ciation v. City of Detroit,123 the court held that such requirements 
were constitutional and within the prerogative of the municipality 
to enact and enforce. It was left to the Michigan court of appeals to 
decide the effect of these decisions on the scope of bargaining. One 
year later, in Detroit Police Officers Association v. City of Detroit,m 
that court held, inter alia, that the residency issue was "no longer 
mandatorily negotiable."125 The Michigan Commission, as of this 
writing, has had the latest, though probably not the last, word on the 
issue. In City of Pontiac (PPOA),126 MERC ruled that the city was 
required to bargain with the police officers' association regarding a 
proposed change in residency requirements. In so doing, MERC 
limited the court of appeals decision strictly to its facts. Thus, the 
question of the duty to bargain over residency requirements in 
Michigan has not been finally resolved. 
C. Judicial Limitations on the Scope of Bargaining 
Another source of restrictions on the scope of bargaining is 
narrow judicial interpretation of statutory language. Just as courts 
have been hesitant to impose a duty to bargain on the public em-
ployer, so have they been reluctant to give expansive interpretations 
to the language governing the scope of bargaining.127 The desire to 
avoid illegal delegations of power, as well as the reluctance to permit 
employee groups to encroach upon areas entrusted to the discretion 
of a political agency are unquestionably valid, if often overstated, 
concerns of the court. These concerns are reinforced by legislative 
120, 5 MERC Lab. Op. 348 (1970). 
121. 6 MERC Lab. Op. 237 (1971). 
122. 383 Mich. 507, 176 N.W.2d 593 (1970). 
123. 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97 (1971), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 950 (1972). 
124. 41 Mich. App. 723, 200 N.W.2d 722 (1972). 
125. 41 Mich. App. at 728, 200 N.W .2d at 725. 
126, 7 MERC Lab. Op. 701 (1972). 
127. See, e.g., Lullo v. Fire Fighters Local 1066, 55 N.J. 409, 440, 262 A.2d 681, 698 
(1970). 
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policy statements which virtually mandate a conservative approach to 
statutory interpretation.128 
Also, statutory deviations from NLRA language have been 
viewed as bases for restrictive interpretations. Illustrative of this last 
point is the recent Connecticut case of West Hartford Education 
Association v. DeCourcy,129 in which the question was whether a 
board of education could be required to bargain with respect to 
the length of the school day and the school calendar. Seizing upon 
the fact that the Teacher Negotiation Act130 defines the scope of 
mandatory bargaining as "salaries and all other conditions of employ-
ment,"131 instead of using the NLRA wording which also specifically 
mentions "hours," the Connecticut supreme court ruled that hours 
of work were not a "condition of employment" under the act. 
Unfortunately, many public sector statutory provisions which are 
at variance with the private sector model do not make clear the 
legislative purpose behind the language modification. Indeed, some 
provisions merely appear to reflect the differences in the employment 
situation seen in the public sectors, but do not otherwise indicate a 
legislative intention to narrow the scope of bargaining. For example, 
the Delaware statute covering teachers provides that the public em-
ployer has a duty to negotiate in good faith with respect to "salaries, 
employee benefits, and working conditions."132 In other state statutes, 
however, the language employed is sufficiently ambiguous to make 
it unclear whether the scope of bargaining was intentionally defined 
to be more narrow than the definition in the NLRA. In Oklahoma, 
for instance, teachers and boards of education are required only to 
bargain with respect to "items affecting the performance of pro-
fessional services,"133 and the South Dakota public employee rela-
128. In Kansas, for example, the legislature adopted the following legislative find-
ings: 
[I']here neither is, nor can be, an analogy of status as between public employees 
and private employees, in fact or law, because of inherent differences in the 
employment relationship arising out of the unique fact that the public employer 
was established by and is run for the benefit of all the people and its authority 
derives not from contract nor the profit motive inherent in the principle of free 
private enterprise, but from the constitution, statutes, civil service rules, regula-
tions and resolutions •••• 
• • • [T]he difference between public and private employment is further reflected 
in the constraints that bar any abdication or bargaining away by public employers 
of their continuing legislative discretion •••• 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-4321(4)-(5) (Supp. 1972). 
129. - Conn. -, 295 A.2d 526 (1972). 
130. CoNN. GEN. STAT, .ANN. §§ 10-153a to -153h (Supp. 1973). 
131. CoNN. GEN. STAT, ANN, § 10-153b (Supp. 1973). 
132. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 14, § 4008(a) (Supp. 1970). 
133. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 509.6 (Supp. 1971). 
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tions act requires bargaining only on "grievance procedures and 
conditions of employment."184 
In all these cases, the problem is essentially the same: state courts 
and/or public employee relations boards are forced to develop case 
law to accommodate the statutory variations. Given the existence of 
the familiar NLRA model, which I would argue is sufficiently flexible 
to accommodate public service, the continued enactment of these 
oddball statutory provisions appears unnecessary. More importantly, 
these ambiguous provisions may actually deter peaceful and effective 
bargaining. Faced with unfamiliar terms, which purport to define 
the subjects of mandatory bargaining, the employer is encouraged·to 
test the parameters of the language by refusing to bargain on border-
line issues. The prosecution of these court challenges is no less time-
consuming, expensive, or irritating than traditional collective bar-
gaining. Furthermore, even if the employer prevails in a single case, 
as in West Hartford, public employees are not likely to cease pressing 
their demands at the bargaining table and before the legislature in 
areas which they believe affect their employment situation. 
D. Statutory Management-Rights Clauses 
Delineating the scope of bargaining is even more difficult where 
statutory management-rights clauses and other statutory exclusions 
are involved. While the whole thrust of private sector case law is to 
define what is bargainable by constant refinement of the term "wages, 
hours and conditions of employment," statutory exclusions are at-
tempts to define bargainability in terms of what is not bargainable. 
Furthermore, while deviations from NLRA language leave the scope 
of bargaining unclear, statutory exclusions create even more con-
fusion. Some state statutes, for instance, provide that the public em-
ployer has the unfettered right to "maintain the efficiency of govern-
ment operations."185 Others declare that the employer has no duty 
to bargain with respect to the mission of the agency186 or matters of 
inherent managerial policy.187 It surely is not clear what these terms 
mean. A public employer, for example, may claim that anything 
done by the agency before the advent of collective bargaining gives 
134. S.D. Co:r,ll'. LAws ANN. § 3-18-2 (Supp. 1972). 
135. E.g., HAWAII REv. STAT. § 89-9(d) (Supp. 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4326(d) 
(Supp. 1972); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 98-C:7 (Supp. 1971); NEV. REv. STAT. § 288.150(2)(e) 
{1971). 
136. E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 905(b) (1972); WIS. STAT. ANN. § lll.91(2)(a) (Supp. 
1973). 
137. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.66(1) (Supp. 1973). 
April 1973] Public Sector Bargaining 915 
evidence of the "mission of the agency" or was done to "maintain the 
efficiency of government operations." Operationalizing such language 
in the context of the objectives of a collective bargaining statute is 
not only difficult, it is unnecessary. 
The foregoing discussion, however, does not lead to the con-
clusion that management-rights clauses are insurmountable obstacles 
to bargaining. A recent case in the federal service138 suggests that, 
over time, ambiguous provisions such as those cited above can be 
reconciled to the requirements of good faith bargaining. Executive 
Order No. 11,491,139 the basic authority for the bargaining rights of 
federal employees, provides in section 12(b)(4) that management 
officials of federal agencies retain the right "to maintain the efficiency 
of the Government operations entrusted to them."140 The managers 
of United States Army Corps of Engineers power plants in Missouri 
and Arkansas invoked this clause to justify scheduling "swing shift" 
operators in order to avoid payment of overtime and holiday pay to 
regular operators in the plants. The Federal Labor Relations Council 
(FLRC), established pursuant to Executive Order No. 11,491 to hear 
unfair labor practice charges, determined that management had 
committed an unfair labor practice when it refused to negotiate 
with respect to its scheduling policies. In responding to the invocation 
of the management-rights provision, the FLRC stated: 
We believe that where otherwise negotiable proposals are in-
volved, the management right in Section 12(b)(4) may not properly 
be invoked to deny negotiations unless there is a substantial demon-
stration by the agency that increased costs or reduced effectiveness 
in operations are inescapable and significant and are not offset by 
compensating benefits.141 
The FLRC may have discovered a method of dealing with statu-
tory management-rights clauses that state public employee relations 
boards would do well to adapt. In effect, the FLRC ruled that man-
agement is free to invoke reserved-rights provisions at any time, but 
a relatively stiff burden will be placed on the employer to show that 
such an invocation is not capricious and that negotiations over the 
item in question would seriously deter the smooth functioning of the 
employer's operations. 
138. !BEW Local 2219, GERR No. 482, at A-2 (No. 7IA-46, Fed. Lab. Rel. Council, 
Nov. 20, 1972). 
I.'.::l. 3 C.F.R. 262 (1973). 
140. 3 C.F.R. 269 (1973). 
141. GERR No. 482, at A-2 (emphasis added). 
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E. The Expanding Scope of the Duty To Bargain 
Actually, the tendency of both meet-and-confer and collective-
negotiations states to limit the scope of bargaining rests on a fear 
that institutionalizing private sector practices in the public sector 
may ultimately pervert the political process. As the decision re-
garding allocation of resources in the public sector is a political 
rather than merely an economic choice, it has been argued that full 
collective bargaining in the public sector may give labor the means 
to enforce its will to the detriment of other, less highly organized 
suitors for government funds.142 
It cannot, of course, be controverted that, in theory, decisions on 
governmental priorities are properly political and should be re-
sponsive to the desires of the constituency as a whole rather than the 
values of a labor union. Yet, in reality, the process of resource alloca-
tion in government is the outcome of a tug-of-war between many 
organized interest groups. 
Current developments in public sector labor laws indicate that 
we may expect to see a widening of the scope of bargaining in all 
states. The experience in Michigan furnishes ample evidence that 
public sector bargaining can be satisfactorily regulated under the 
private sector concept of the duty to bargain. A state public employ-
ment relations board is usually quite capable of deciding, on the 
basis of private sector precedents and public sector bargaining ex-
periences, which subjects should be deemed "mandatory" for bar-
gaining purposes. The case-by-case decision-making approach on 
mandatory subjects is vastly superior to a rigid legislative limitation 
on the scope of bargaining, because if experience proves the initial 
judgment to be erroneous, it is easier for a state board to reverse itself 
than it is to get a modification of a state statute in the legislature. 
In this regard, one may ask whether it is ever sensible to attempt 
to limit the scope of bargaining by statute. The collective bargaining 
process is in part a therapeutic process, and it should permit the 
parties to address fully all problems which affect the bargaining 
relationship. If the employer is opposed to a given union demand, 
he can discuss the problem raised, and then, if appropriate, he can 
persist in rejecting it. This is a more satisfactory approach, in terms 
of achieving stable and harmonious labor relations, than to have the 
employer refuse to discuss an issue in the first instance because it is 
legally nonnegotiable. It may be worthwhile to recall the dissent of 
142. H. WELLINGTON &: R. WINTER, supra note 11, at 29-32. 
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Justice Harlan in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner,143 
where he argued: 
The bargaining process should be left fluid, free from intervention 
... leading to premature crystallization of labor agreements into any 
one pattern of contract provisions, so that these agreements can be 
adapted through collective bargaining to the changing needs of our 
society and to the changing concepts of the responsibilities of labor 
and management.144 
At the present time, the predicted trend toward a more liberal 
approach to the scope of bargaining in the public sector already 
appears to be developing. At the federal level, for example, a "Scope 
of Bargaining Project," currently underway at the Civil Service Com-
mission, is preparing proposals for streamlining the Federal Per-
sonnel Manual, which is now the source of extensive restrictions on 
bargaining in the federal service. Civil Service Commission Chairman 
Robert Hampton recently outlined both the nature of these restric-
tions and the goals of the "Scope of Bargaining Project" in a speech 
before the Personnel Directors' Conference of the Federal Executive 
Institute, as follows: 
The legal limitations which are imposed on the scope of bar-
gaining in the Federal sector by "applicable laws and regulations" 
account for the significant and fundamental differences from labor-
management relations in private industry. Many of the basic terms 
and conditions of employment which typically are fashioned by the 
collective bargaining process in the private sector are determined by 
law or regulation in the Federal sector. These include: 
-Basic economic items such as pay, hours, certain fringe benefits 
and retirement. 
-Fundamental personnel policies such as merit staffing, job clas-
sification, performance rating and layoff. 
-Protection of individual job security such as through statutory 
appeal rights to the Civil Service Commission. 
The Objective of the Scope of Bargaining project is to remove 
barriers in the [Federal Personnel Manual] to negotiations, not to 
determine what is negotiable or to come up with a laundry list of 
negotiable items. Instead, the project is designed to (I) pin-point 
[Civil Service Commission] policies and regulations that might be un-
desirably restrictive, and (2) suggest how they might be changed to 
broaden or remove uncertainty about the scope of bargaining in the 
Federal Service.145 
143. 356 U.S. 342 (1957). 
144. 356 U.S. at 358-59. 
145. Remarks of Civil Service Commission Chairman Robert Hampton, 1972 Con-
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At the state level, the public employment relations boards and 
courts in several states, notably Michigan, New York, ·wisconsin, 
and Pennsylvania, have been in the forefront of the movement to-
ward expanded public sector bargaining. In 1972, the New York 
court of appeals, in a landmark decision, Board of Education v. 
Associated Teachers of Huntington,146 ruled that, in light of the 
Taylor Act147 (governing public sector bargaining generally), a school 
board had authority to enter into a collective bargaining agreement 
granting benefits to teachers, even though there was no specific statu-
tory authorization to do so. In reaching this result, the court stated 
that 
the validity of a provision found in a collective agreement negoti-
ated by a public employer turns upon whether it constitutes a term 
or condition of employment. If it does, then, the public employer 
must negotiate as to such term or condition and, upon reaching an 
understanding, must incorporate it into the collective agreement un-
less some statutory provision circumscribes its power to do so . 
• . . Under the Taylor Law, the obligation to bargain as to all 
terms and conditions of employment is a broad and unqualified one, 
and there is no reason why the mandatory provision of that act 
should be limited, in any way, except in cases where some other ap-
plicable statutory provision explicitly and definitely prohibits the 
public employer from making an agreement as to a particular term 
or condition of employment.148 
Notwithstanding the importance of the New York court's deci-
sion, most of the progress in defining the scope of bargaining in the 
public sector is an accomplishment of state labor boards.149 By far, 
the class of public employees who have most actively sought to test 
the scope of mandatory bargaining before state boards has been the 
public school teachers, and it is in this area that the boards have made 
ference of Directors of Personnel, Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Va. (April, 
1972), excerpted in GERR No. 450, at E-1, E-2, E-4 (May 1, 1972). 
146. 30 N.Y.2d 122, 282 N.E.2d 109, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972). 
147, N.Y. C1v. SERV. LAw §§ 200-14 (McKinney 1973). 
148. 30 N.Y.2d at 127, 129, 282 N.E.2d at 112-13, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 21, 23 (emphasis 
added). 
149. There are two types of state labor boards in the public sector: those dealing 
with both private and public sector questions and those handling only public sector 
matters. There are small but sometimes significant differences in the decisions which 
emanate from each type of board. Boards which deal with both sectors are more willing 
to follow private sector precedents than boards which deal only with the public sector. 
For example, the Michigan Employment Relations Commission, which hears cases from 
both sectors, is inclined to be more generous in upholding a union's right to bargain 
with respect to any particular question than is the New York Public Employment Rela-
tions Board, whose jurisdiction is more limited. Compare City of Detroit, 3 MERC Lab. 
Op. 492 (1968), with West Irondequoit Bd. of Educ., 4 N.Y. PERB 3725, affd. on rehear-
ing, 4 N.Y. PERB 3753 (1971). 
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the greatest expansion of the scope of bargaining. One of the first 
cases which suggested that the scope of management discretion over 
educational policy is not as broad as had been previously thought 
was a Michigan trial examiner's decision in North Dearborn Heights 
School District.160 Before the case was ultimately settled, the examiner 
caused a bit of a furor in Michigan education circles by holding all 
fourteen of the submitted issues to be bargainable, including curric-
ulum, classroom schedules and class sizes, selection of textbook 
materials, and a number of other subjects formerly thought to be 
within the exclusive discretion of the board of education. While no 
labor board decision has gone as far since, the fear that collective 
bargaining over some of these matters may lead to abdication of the 
school board's responsibility and a loss of local control over schools 
has apparently lessened. Increasingly, formerly permissive or for-
bidden subjects have become mandatory. The Pennsylvania Labor 
Relations Board recently reversed an earlier decision by holding that 
five of twenty-one formerly nonbargainable subjects were negotiable 
and that the other sixteen "may be bargainable.''161 
Public education provides an excellent environment for the 
development of the case-by-case method of defining the scope of 
bargaining. Such matters as the length of the school day, the academic 
calendar, classroom size, and extra-curricular assignments clearly re-
late to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. 
150. 1 MERC Lab. Op. 434 (1966). Compare Aberdeen Educ. Assn. v. Aberdeen Bd. 
of Educ., 82 L.R.R.M. 2287 (S.D. Cir. Ct. 1972). In that case, the Aberdeen Education 
Association submitted a list of fifteen items for negotiation. The board of education 
replied with a list of four items, refusing to negotiate on such items as elementary 
conferences, teachers' aides, class size, audio-visual expansion, school-wide guidance and 
counseling programs, mandatory retirement of administrators, elementary planning 
periods, and budget allowances. A South Dakota circuit court upheld the board's re-
fusal, ruling that these were not proper subjects for bargaining. 
151. State College Area School Dist., GERR No. 464, at B-2 (Case No. PERA-C-929-C, 
June 26, 1972), The scope of mandatory bargaining may include not only substantive 
issues, but also "procedural" questions that have to do with the conduct of negotia-
tions. This point was recently made by the Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations, 
in Town of Stratford, Dec. No. 1069 (May 26, 1972). The case involved a dispute 
between the town and four unions representing municipal employees over the legality 
of an ordinance requiring the publication of union bargaining proposals. In ruling 
that the ordinance violated the Connecticut Municipal Employee Relations Act, CONN. 
GEN, STAT. ANN. §§ 7-467 to -477 (1972), the Board held that preliminary arrangements 
for negotiation, including publicity, constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining 
under the Act. Tl1e town ordinance was tlterefore held to be a prohibited practice, 
since it l1ad the effect of unilaterally establishing the ground rules for negotiation. The 
Board rejected the town's contention that the ordinance governed only a matter of 
internal communications, even tltough one of the aims of the ordinance was to keep 
the town council informed of the progress of negotiations. The Board also held that the 
Connecticut "right-to-know" statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-19 to -21 (1972), did 
not require public disclosure of bargaining proposals. These proposals, said the Board, 
"do not automatically and immediately become public records." Dec. No. 1069, Slip 
Op. at 8. 
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Yet, they also are matters closely connected with educational policy, 
usually considered to be within the authority of the school board. 
This potential overlap of management functions with bargainable 
subjects leads to some rather fine line-drawing by labor boards as 
they attempt to strike a proper balance "between the duty of elected 
officials to make decisions for the entire electorate and the statutory 
right of employees to negotiate items directly affecting terms and 
conditions of employment."152 
The difficulty of striking this kind of balance is illustrated by 
the New York PERB decision in West Irondequoit Board of Educa-
tion,153 where the principal issue was class size. The hearing officer 
determined that class size was a mandatory subject, since it was an 
"integral component of the working environment."154 The Board, 
however, modified the order, holding that class size was a policy 
decision. In so doing, it drew a distinction between teaching load, 
a mandatory subject of bargaining, and class size-a result which 
provoked the dissenting member to observe that "the impact of 
numerical limitations of class size upon teaching load is so direct 
as to make a line of demarcation impossible."155 
152. West Irondequoit Bd. of Educ., 4 N.Y. PER.B 4606, 4609 (1971) (hearing officer's 
decision and recommended order). 
153. 4 N.Y. PERB 3725 (1971), afjd. on rehearing, 4 N.Y. PER.B 3753 (1971) (board 
decision and order). 
154. 4 N.Y. PER.B at 4609. 
155. 4 N.Y. PERB at 3728. The problem of the negotiability of questions of class 
size and related issues was recently encountered by the Hawaii Public Employment 
Relations Board (HERB) in two cases. Like its New York counterpart, HER.B experi-
enced line-drawing difficulties in these areas. HERB agreed with the New York Board 
that class size was a "hybrid issue," but it came to the opposite conclusion regarding 
its bargainability. After balancing the respective interests of the parties, HERB held 
class size to be a mandatory subject of bargaining. Hawaii State Teachers Assn., GERR 
No. 480, at E-1 (Case No. CE-05-4, Dec. No. 22, Oct. 24, 1972). 
In the second case, Petition for Declaratory Ruling by the Department of Education, 
GERR No. 487, at B-9 (Case No. DR-05-5, Dec. No. 26, Jan. 12, 1973), however, HER.B 
held similar issues to be nonbargainable, again in contrast to New York precedent. The 
Hawaii State Teachers' Association, under a reopener provision of the contract, had 
demanded that the teachers be granted preparation periods within the students' 
instructional day and that workloads be limited. HERB referred to its earlier decision, 
which it justified by noting that 
[n]otwithstanding its admitted relation to educational policy, [HERB] found in 
that instance that the element of impact on teachers' working conditions was 
great, while the imposition of an average, statewide class size ratio had minimum 
impact on the [board of education's] right to establish educational policy. 
GERR No. 487, at B-13. The Hawaii Board found this rationale not to be controlling 
in the second case, however. It said that the teacher workload proposal would force the 
board of education to hire teachers and expand facilities regardless of its right and 
duty to maintain efficient operations. HERB reasoned that 
when the [board of education) is required to utilize methods which would cause 
deterioration of the learning environment of the students, such as placing two 
teachers in the same classroom or increasing team teaching regardless of a teacher's 
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Where line-drawing is difficult and statutory language gives little 
guidance, private sector precedents often become a compelling re-
course. In City School District of the City of New Rochelle,156 the 
New York PERB closely adhered to private sector precedent in 
upholding the right of a school board to make budget cuts resulting 
in the termination of the services of a number of teachers. The Board 
noted that such budget cuts "obviously" affect terms and conditions 
of employment. The Board concluded however that "the decision 
to curtail services and eliminate jobs is not a mandatory subject of 
negotiations, although the employer is obligated to negotiate on the 
impact of such decision on the terms and conditions of employment 
of the employees affected."157 Evident in this decision was the Board's 
reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Fibreboard Paper 
Products Corp. v. NLRB.1r.s 
The recent MERC decision in Westwood Community Schools,159 
which may prove to be a landmark opinion, suggests a two-part 
balancing test for determining whether a subject falls within man-
agement prerogative or whether it is a term or condition of employ-
ment and therefore a mandatory subject for bargaining. The tests 
are: "(l) Is the subject of such vital concern to both labor and man-
agement that it is likely to lead to controversy and industrial con-
flict? And (2) is collective bargaining appropriate for resolving such 
issues?"160 At least two alternative readings could be given to the 
JVestwood test. On the one hand, the test is offered as a substitute 
for the mandatory-permissive distinction utilized in the private 
sector. Since that distinction is merely a shorthand way of deter-
mining, on an ad hoc basis, whether the employer must bargain over 
ability to team teach, it becomes obvious that the (board's] right and duty to 
provide the best educational system possible is being mterfered with. 
GERR No. 487, at B-13. 
The opposite results of the New York and Hawaii Boards are partially explained by 
the existence of HAWAII REv. STAT. § 89-9(d) (Supp. 1971), which prevents public 
employers from agreeing to proposals that would restrict their rights to direct employees 
and maintain an efficient government operation. However, it is not clear that this 
management-rights clause wholly explains the contrasting outcomes. It appears that 
two Boards have looked at similar facts and, using different but equally plausible 
reasons, have arrived at opposite conclusions. 
urn. 4 N.Y. PERB 3704 (1971). 
157. 4 N.Y. PERB at 3706 (emphasis added). 
158. 379 U.S. 203 (1964). See also City of Flint, 7 MERC Lab. Op. 913 (1972) (City 
Civil Service Commission violated Michigan Public Employment Relations Act by re-
fusing to bargain over the effects of reinstated residency requirements on city em-
ployees). 
159. 7 MERC Lab. Op. 313 (1972). 
160. 7 MERC Lab. Op. at 318-19. 
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a given subject, the Westwood test may not be substantially different 
from the private sector rule, but simply another and possibly a more 
flexible formulation designed to reach the same end. Yet, a more 
innovative interpretation was suggested by the language of the 
Commission itself: 
A balancing approach to bargaining may be more suited to the 
realities of the public sector than the dichotomized scheme-manda-
tory and non-mandatory-used in the private sector. [The private 
sector] scheme prohibits the use of economic weapons to compel 
agreement to discuss non-mandatory subjects of bargaining, but 
strikes are permissible once the point of impasse concerning manda-
tory subjects of bargaining is reached. Economic force is illegal in 
the public sector . . . . In Michigan, in the public sector, economic 
battle is to be replaced by invocation of the impasse resolution pro-
cedures of mediation and fact finding. 
An expansion of the subjects about which the public employer 
ought to bargain, unlike the private sector, should not result in a 
corresponding increase in the use of economic force to resolve im-
passes. In the absence of legal public sector strikes, our only proper 
concern in the area of subjects of bargaining is whether the employ-
er's management functions are being unduly restrained. All bargain-
ing has some limiting effect on an employer. 
Therefore, we will not order bargaining in those cases where the 
subjects are demonstrably within the core of entrepreneurial control. 
Alt4ough such subjects may affect interests of employees, we do not 
believe that such interests outweigh the right to manage.161 
The Commission's juxtaposition of the duty to bargain and the 
strike proscription impliedly presents the novel suggestion that the 
scope of bargaining ought to be broader in the public sector than in 
the private sector. According to this interpretation, since public 
employees are ostensibly prevented from using the strike, or the 
threat of a strike, to gain leverage at the bargaining table, there is 
no point in severely restricting the subjects which may be brought 
up in negotiations. The public employer cannot be penalized by 
work stoppages for taking a hard-line bargaining position, nor is it 
compelled to agree with any position taken by the employees' union 
on any subject. Therefore, if the strike proscription is in effect and 
is enforced, the agenda at the bargaining table should be open to 
virtually any subject. The government, it may be suggested, has 
the last word on the composition of the contract in any case, either 
because the public employer has agreed to its terms, or because the 
legislature must finally approve the contract. 
Certainly, the language of the Westwood test suggests a very 
broad scope for bargaining: the scope of bargaining may include any 
161. 7 MERC Lab. Op. at 320-21. 
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subject that "is likely to lead to controversy and industrial conflict." 
Arguably, such language includes a number of subjects not within 
the definition of "wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employ-
ment"-the scope of mandatory bargaining in the private sector. 
Instead of being a different method of formulating the mandatory-
permissive distinction, therefore, the Westwood test may in fact 
foreshadow a movement to free public sector bargaining from the 
confines of this distinction. 
One caveat must be added, however. The validity of the second 
interpretation of the Westwood test depends on not only the exis-
tence, but also the effectiveness of the strike proscription. In those 
states where strikes are legal, 162 the ·w estwood test would seem in-
applicable. In those states where strikes are illegal, but the proscrip-
tion is not enforced, the application of the Westwood test would 
seem to give public unions an unfair advantage at the negotiating 
table, perhaps enabling them to coerce agreement on subjects that 
in the private sector would not be mandatory subjects of bargaining. 
In states such as New York, however, where the strike proscription 
seems to be enforced with some vigor, the broader reading of the 
TVestwood test may be of some value in delineating the parameters of 
the duty to bargain. 
VII. THE DURATION OF THE DUTY To BARGAIN 
Once it has been established that a subject is a mandatory or 
permissive subject of bargaining, the next issue is: When may an 
employer refuse to bargain further and take unilateral action in-
stead? 
In the private sector, an employer cannot take unilateral action 
with regard to a mandatory subject where there has been no bar-
gaining. However, following negotiations to a point of impasse on a 
mandatory subject, the employer can take unilateral action, so long 
as it does not exceed the terms of his final offer to the union.163 
In the private sector, it has also generally been held that an 
employer may take unilateral action at any time with respect to a 
permissive subject.164 These rules would seem applicable in those 
162. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. 
163. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v. U.S. Sonics Corp., 312 F.2d 610 
(1st Cir. 1963). Cf. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U.S. 217 (1949). 
164. Chemical Workers Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glas.s Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971). 
But see District 1, Marine Engrs., Docket No. BCB-91-71, Dec. No. B-1-72 (N.Y. City 
Office of Collective Bargaining, Jan. 7, 1972), in which it was held that, during the 
course of contract negotiations, a public employer may not take unilateral action with 
respect to a "permissive" subject which was covered by a provision in the parties' 
expired collective bargaining a~eement ttntil after the conclusion of impasse panel 
proceedings. 
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states where the pure collective-negotiations model regulates the 
public sector. In pure meet-and-confer states, a public employer 
presumably is free to implement unilaterally any proposals once the 
statutory obligation to discuss them ·with the union has been 
satisfied. In the modified meet-and-confer states, there is simply no 
precedent to aid in the determination of how long an employer must 
confer with the union in order to satisfy the obligation to "meet 
and confer in good faith." It may be assumed that the obligation is 
satisfied once it can truly be said that the employer has seriously 
considered all of the union's proposals that are properly the subject 
of bargaining. But whether there is an obligation to meet and confer 
to a point of impasse may depend upon the terms of the governing 
statute.165 
Most public employers in jurisdictions which require collective 
negotiations must bargain at least to impasse. However, the duration 
of the duty to bargain in the public sector may extend beyond 
impasse because most states and the federal government prescribe 
elaborate impasse resolution mechanisms, including mediation, fact-
fi.nding, legislative hearings, and compulsory arbitration, which may 
be invoked following impasse. Both the public employer and union 
are required to participate in the impasse procedures, once invoked, 
in a further effort to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement. Im-
passe procedures thus clearly contemplate further "negotiations" 
by the parties even where both sides have declared an impasse. As a 
result, a public employer may not be able to take unilateral action 
with regard to a mandatory subject, if at all, until after all impasse 
procedures have been exhausted.166 
165. The question of when an impasse has been reached was recently dealt with in 
the Connecticut case of West Hartford Educ. Assn. v. DeCourcy, - Conn.-, 295 A.2d 
526 (1972): 
Some bargaining may go on even though the parties are unable to agree on 
many topics. But, only if the deadlock on the critical issue demonstrates that there 
is no realistic possibility that further discussions will be fruitful in bringing the 
parties together generally on salaries and other conditions of employment can we 
conclude that there is an impasse. 
- Conn. at -, 295 A.2d at 542. This definition does not appear too different from the 
one used in the private sector. In NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472 (1963), the 
Fifth Circuit defined an impasse as "a state of facts in which the parties, despite the 
best of faith, are simply deadlocked." 318 F.2d at 482. The factors relevant to the deter• 
mination of whether an impasse exists should include: good faith bargaining up to the 
point of deadlock; willingness to continue bargaining if it appears to offer hope of 
resolving the deadlock; disagreement on all outstanding issues, or at least on all major 
issues; and willingness to call in a mediator if necessary. In general, it must appear 
that, despite the best efforts of the parties, there is no real prospect of an immediate 
resolution of the problem through bargaining. See Comment, Impasse in Collective 
Bargaining, 44 TEXAS L. REv. '769 (1966). 
166. Cf. District 1, Marine Engrs., Docket No. BCB-91-71, Dec. No. B-1-72 (N.Y. City 
Office of Collective Bargaining, Jan. 7, 1972), discussed in note 164 supra. 
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In City of Dearborn,167 the Michigan Employment Relations 
Commission firmly established the duty to bargain beyond impasse 
for Michigan by ruling that a public employer failed to satisfy its 
obligation to bargain in good faith when it refused to negotiate over 
the recommendations contained in a fact finder's decision. In its 
decision, MERC held that the mediation provision of the Michigan 
Public Employment Relations Act168 "implicitly incorporates fact 
finding into the collective bargaining process as it is contemplated by 
the obligation of the duty to bargain."169 The Commission went on 
to say: 
Just as a strike may create conditions in which the parties would be 
more willing to make concessions to compromise the matters in dif-
ference, the fact finder's recommendations may enlighten or persuade 
them of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of their bargaining 
position. The fact finder's report, thus, is the functional equivalent 
of a strike and may change the factual situation regarding "the ne-
gotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder." ... 
It must be given the same serious consideration as the initial bar-
gaining proposals. Therefore, there is an affirmative obligation to 
bargain in good faith about the substantive recommendations of the 
report of a statutory fact finder.110 
The city was held to have violated its obligation to bargain after 
impasse because "[a]lthough the City demonstrated a willingness to 
attend conferences and discuss the fact finder's report, it did not make 
a serious attempt to reconcile its differences with the Union."171 The 
city was ordered to bargain; however, the Commission agreed with 
the city that it had no statutory authority to order the city to imple-
ment the fact finder's recommendations as a remedy for the refusal 
to bargain.172 
Additional support for the proposition that the duty to bargain 
in the public sector extends beyond impasse is provided by East 
Hartford Education Association v. East Hartford Board of Educa-
tion.173 The board and the association in this case failed to reach 
agreement on a contract, even after mediation was invoked and the 
dispute was submitted to nonbinding arbitration. Both parties re-
167. 7 MERC Lab. Op. 749 (1972). 
168. MICH. CoMP. I.Aws ANN. § 42!1.207 (1967). 
169. 7 MERC Lab. Op. at 757. 
170. 7 MERC Lab. Op. at 758. 
171. 7 MERC Lab. Op. at 759. 
172. 7 MERC Lab. Op. at 760. This finding is analogous to the Supreme Court's 
decision in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970) (NLRB not authorized by law 
to compel an employer to agree to a dues checkoff provision as a remedy for bad faith 
bargaining). 
173. GERR No. 484, at B-8 (No. 17 82 87, Hartford County, Conn., Super. Ct., Nov. 
10, 1972). 
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jected parts of the arbitrator's award, and, at that point, the board 
refused to bargain further, claiming its legal duty had ceased. In 
granting the association's petition for an injunction, Judge Naruk 
said, "To argue that a board of education or teachers' union that 
remains obdurate throughout the statutory procedures provided for 
has c6mplied with the policy of the act is to exalt form over sub-
stance."174 
East Hartford must be analyzed in light of the particular statutory 
procedures provided. The final step of the impasse procedure in the 
Connecticut teachers' bargaining law provides only for advisory 
arbitration.175 Where statutes contain provisions for final and binding 
arbitration,176 the problems encountered in East Hartford are un-
likely to arise, for unless the arbitrator exceeds his authority, the 
issuance of an award determines the composition of the contract. 
Statutes containing nonbinding settlement procedures are much 
more common, however. Where these statutes are controlling, the 
import qf East Hartford, to the extent it is followed elsewhere, may 
be that the parties may never reach the point where unilateral im-
plementation is permissible. At the very least, the case stands for 
the proposition that mere participation in statutory impasse proce-
dures does not relieve a party of the duty to bargain in good faith. 
An unyielding posture, characteristic of the state of impasse in the 
private sector, may not be tolerable in the public sector. 
The strike proscription, which is responsible for the suggestion 
that there is a duty to bargain beyond impasse in the public sector, 
is also the basis for New York holdings that at least some provisions 
of an expired contract carry over until a new contract can be 
negotiated. In Board of Education v. Connectquot Teachers Asso-
ciation,177 the supreme court for Suffolk County held that the board 
was required to arbitrate a dispute notwithstanding the expiration 
of the contract containing the arbitration clause. The court stated 
that 
[i]f public employees are prohibited from striking then they must be 
protected during the hiatus between the expiration date of the old 
contract and the signing of a new collective bargaining agree-
ment. . •• Thus employees, who comply with the law, are entitled 
to the maintenance of the status quo during the course of negotia-
tions,178 
174. GERR No. 484, at 13-10. 
175. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153f(c) (Supp. 1973). 
176. E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.231-.247 (Supp. 1972). 
177. 81 LR.R.M. 2253 (1972). 
178. 81 L.R.R.M. at 2254. Cf. District 1, Marine Engrs., Docket No. BCB-91-71, Dec, 
No. B-1-72 (N.Y. City Office of Collective Bargaining, Jan. 7, 1972), discussed in note 
164 supra. 
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The New York PERB has reasoned similarly with respect to other 
contract provisions. In Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority,179 
PERB upheld a hearing officer's decision that the authority could 
not refuse longevity increases to employees whose anniversaries arose 
after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement and_,.before 
a new one could be negotiated, noting: 
['I]he statutory prohibition against an employee organization resort-
ing to self help by striking imposes a correlative duty upon a public 
employer to refrain from altering terms and conditions of employ-
ment unilaterally during the course of negotiations. This duty of an 
employer in the public sector to refrain from self help is greater than 
is the similar duty of private sector employers.180 
VIII. ENFORCEMENT OF THE DUTY To BARGAIN 
Most collective-negotiations states and some modified meet-and-
confer states181 now provide for the enforcement of the duty to bar-
gain by codes of unfair labor practices, which are often patterned 
after section 8 of the NLRA and administered by state labor relations 
boards. In Minnesota the remedy for unfair labor practices is an 
action in district court.182 In Oregon, a refusal to bargain in good 
faith is not specifically made an unfair labor practice but is subject 
to fact-finding hearings by the Oregon PERB.183 In a number of 
other states, however, no unfair labor practices are stipulated;184 
presumably, the aggrieved party in these cases should seek equitable 
relief in court, provided that the statute otherwise requires good 
faith bargaining. 
Whatever the bargaining obligation placed upon public em-
ployers and employees, it must be made inescapable. Strict enforce-
ment is particularly important in view of the fact that strikes-even 
those provoked by a public employer's unfair labor practice-are 
ordinarily prohibited in absolute terms.185 But effective enforcement 
is difficult where legislatures and courts are inclined to stress the 
differences between public and private sectors to the end of limiting 
the effectiveness of the bargaining process in the public sector. For 
example, good faith bargaining cannot thrive when public employers 
are led to believe that they may escape the consequences of a bad 
179. 5 N.Y. PERB 3064 (1972). 
180. 5 N.Y. PERB at 3064-65 (emphasis added). 
181. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4333 (Supp. 1972). 
182. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.68(1) {Supp. 1973). 
183. ORE. REv. STAT. § 243.745 (1971). 
184. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 98-C, §§ 1-7 (Supp. 1971); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. 
§§ 3-18-1 to -17 (Supp. 1972). 
185. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.68(1) (Supp. 1973). 
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bargain by a postnegotiations court challenge on the ground that 
the disputed contract was ultra vires. In such an atmosphere, the 
employer may be tempted to choose the easy path of agreeing to 
contract provisions with which it cannot comply and which it has 
no intention of honoring. Precedents such as Huntington Teach-
ers,186 in which the New York court of appeals flatly rejected the 
board of education's contention that it lacked authority to agree to 
the challenged provisions can only enhance effective collective bar-
gaining. The public employer must be convinced that it will be 
required to live with whatever agreement is executed. 
The need to appropriate public money to pay for negotiated 
increases in wages and benefits is another characteristic unique to the 
public sector that creates enforcement problems. It may be conceded 
that, without its consent, a state legislature may not be compelled to 
make appropriations; however, a public employer should not be able 
to use a failure to appropriate as an excuse for either a refusal to 
bargain or the total repudiation of an existing agreement. Rather, 
both parties should be expected to make whatever adjustments are 
necessary to accommodate the financial limitations of the employer. 
In other words, the requirement of good faith bargaining should not 
terminate in the face of fiscal obstacles. 
An example of the type of adjustment that parties can make to 
deal with financial limitations was seen in the Massachusetts decision, 
Norton Teachers' Association v. Town of Norton.181 In that case, 
the teachers were paid below the negotiated salary rate during the 
first year of the contract because of an insufficient legislative appro-
priation. As a consequence, the agreement was amended to make an 
appropriate increase in the salaries for the subsequent year. The 
Massachusetts supreme court upheld the authority of the school 
committee to agree to the amended contract on the basis of its au-
thority to manage the public schools. The court prohibited the town 
from withholding the necessary appropriation, which was othenv'ise 
available, to cover the salary increases; the wage obligations were 
seen as being no different from any other public debt. 
Where public employers have attempted to use financial con-
siderations as excuses for refusing to bargain or for repudiating an 
agreement, courts and labor boards have recently exhibited a willing-
ness to intervene. In a recent Michigan case, City of Flint,188 the city 
refused to bargain with the general employees of the municipality 
pending arbitration of a dispute involving the city firemen and possi-
186. See text accompanying notes 146-48 supra. 
187. - Mass. -, 279 N.E.2d 659 (1972). 
188. 7 MERC Lab. Op. 240 (1972). 
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hie arbitration with police. The city claimed that it could not make 
a wage offer since it would not know how much money was available 
until after the arbitration. The Michigan Employment Relations 
Commission, however, determined that the city could not refuse to 
bargain with one group of employees because of the financial un-
certainty resulting from a dispute with another group. The New York 
PERB reached an analogous result in City of Albany.189 
The lesson of the Michigan and New York cases is clear: financial 
uncertainty is no justification for a total refusal to bargain. It is just 
as clear, however, that such uncertainty can be a basis for a hard-line 
position in negotiations. Hard bargaining is not in itself an unfair 
labor practice, even in the private sector.190 The public employer 
can take appropriations cutbacks into consideration in bargaining, 
just as a private employer can take a sales decrease or a decline in 
profits into account. Similarly, the public employer can take into 
consideration the impact of bargaining on other units, as in cases 
where pattern settlements are the rule or wage-parity agreements are 
in effect.191 But there is a line between hard bargaining and no 
bargaining, and vigorous enforcement of the duty to bargain can help 
to clarify the contours of that line. 
It is increasingly apparent in the developing case law that once a 
contract has been signed, the public employer must, in effect, "adopt" 
the contract and do everything reasonably within its power to see that 
it is carried out. One way to "adopt" is for the public employer to 
make economic benefits under the contract a priority item in its 
budget. Illustratively, in Board of Education of the City of Bufjalo,192 
the New York PERB held that the board of education did not have 
complete discretion to rearrange school programs following the legis-
lature's grant of a smaller appropriation than had been requested. 
189. 5 N.Y. PERB 3061 (1972) (board decision), a/fg. 5 N.Y. PERB 4537 (1972), in 
which the hearing officer ruled that budgetary uncertainty was no excuse for a refusal 
to bargain on wage demands, especially since the amount of available funds would not 
be known before the statutory impasse procedure was to come into effect. The hearing 
officer stated that City School Dist. of the City of New Rochelle, 4 N.Y. PERB 3704 
(1971) (discussed in text at notes 156-58 supra), 
countenances some delay by a fiscally troubled employer in submitting negotiating 
counterproposals on economic matters •••• But New Rochelle cannot be read as 
absolving an employer of its obligation to submit any counterproposals on salaries 
throughout an entire course of negotiations •••• 
5 N.Y. PERB at 4541. 
190. Dierks Forests, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 923 (1964). 
191. City of Detroit (DPOA), 7 MERC Lab. Op. 1053 (1972). The city could take 
into consideration a previous arbitration award granting firemen and police parity in 
pay. It was, therefore, not an unfair labor practice for the city to bargain on the basis 
that whatever salary increases the police could win would automatically go to firemen 
as well. 
192. 4 N.Y. PERB 4634 (1971). 
930 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:885 
Mandatory subjects covered in the contract with the union were 
held to take precedence over nonmandated programs in the allocation 
of mon·ey under a less-than-fully-funded budget. This notion was 
also recently explored-in great detail-in State v. AFSC11f.E Local 
1726193 where the court ruled that since the subject of health insur-
ance was within the scope of bargaining, a provision dealing with 
health insurance in a collective bargaining agreement was lawful and 
the State Department of Health and Social Services was required 
to find the funds to implement the agreement. Signing the agree-
ment, the court noted, obligated the Department to "pursue every 
step within its power to see that the insurance is provided."194 
A second method of "adoption" is for the public employer to 
ensure that the legislature (local or state) is aware of the need for an 
appropriation to fulfill the terms of the contract. In some states,195 
the public employer has a duty to submit a request for an appro-
priation within a certain time period after an agreement is reached. 
In Connecticut, failure to submit such a request is a "prohibited 
practice."196 Whether the employer has any duty beyond bare sub-
mission in these states has not yet been determined. But the employer 
may have a responsibility for shepherding the request for appropria-
tions through the legislature, at least at the local level. In the Rhode 
Island case of Town of Scituate v. Scituate Teachers' Association,191 
the Providence County superior court, reprimanding a school com-
mittee for not making its financial problems clear to the town meet-
ing and for failing to call a special meeting to present the problem to 
the voters, said, in effect, that the public employer must "try harder" 
to acquire the means to fulfill its obligations.198 
193. 81 L.R.R.M. 2836 (Del. Ch. 1972). 
194. 81 L.R.R.M. at 2840. The court conceded that the state could not be bound to 
spend funds not appropriated, but went on to observe: 
On the other hand, the legislature certainly could not have intended that 
agencies of the State should enter into these agreements and not be bound 
thereby .••• [S]uch an interpretation would make a mockery and a meaningless 
exercise of the statute .••• It follows that although their agreement could not 
bind the department to the expenditure of funds for health insurance until those 
funds had been properly appropriated, it could and did bind the department to 
do all of those things contemplated which were within the department's legitimate 
powers ..•• [T]he department may not hide behind a veil of administrative in-
action drawn across the terms of an othenvise properly negotiated instrument. 
81 L.R.R.M. at 2839. 
195. E.g., CONN. STAT. ANN. § 7-474(b) (1972); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 1781 (Supp. 
1972). 
196. CONN. STAT. ANN. § 7-474(b) (1972). A prohibited practice is virtually synony-
mous with "unfair labor practice" as used in the NLRA. See CONN. STAT. ANN. § 7-470 
(1972). 
197. 82 L.R.R.M. 2005, af/d., - R.I. -, 296 A.2d 466 (1972). 
198. This dispute arose when the town meeting rejected the school committee's 
request for a budget increase to pay higher teachers' salaries which the committee had 
negotiated. As a result, the committee was confronted with the choice of fulfilling the 
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"Adoption" may also be accomplished through a third method-
by having the public employer use its emergency powers to fulfill its 
contractual obligations. In Union Free School District No. 5,199 the 
New York PERB held that the employer had failed to bargain in 
good faith over pay increases and fringe benefits, despite the fact that 
the voters had rejected two proposed budgets, leaving the school 
district without adequate funding. PERB noted that the New York 
Education Law permits a school board to levy, on its own initiative, 
ta.xes necessary to pay for "teachers salaries" and "ordinary contin-
gent expenses" when the voters reject proposed budgets,2'JO and since 
salary matters were specifically covered by the law, and fringe benefits 
were covered by the phrase "ordinary contingent expenses," the em-
ployer was not precluded either in fact or by law from paying the 
agreed-upon increases. 
Regardless of whether the administrative arm of government 
fulfills its duty to adopt the contract, additional complications may 
arise if the local legislature remains obdurate and refuses to make 
appropriations to finance the contract. In affirming the superior 
court's dismissal of Town of Scituate,201 where the trial court noted 
the possible problems which such a refusal would create, the Rhode 
Island supreme court said that it was not clear "whether and to what 
extent a school committee may bind a_municipality to financial com-
mitments for school purposes which cannot be satisfied from funds 
appropriated or othenvise available for those purposes."202 In an-
other context, however, the Rhode Island supreme court has, in 
effect, required an appropriation to be made by holding that an 
arbitration award granting disputed benefits had the effect of a 
judgment and that the lack of an appropriation was no excuse for 
failure to pay a contractual debt.203 A common pleas court in Penn-
sylvania has taken this reasoning one step farther. Even though no 
judgment was involved, the court held that the contract itself pro-
vided sufficient authority for the court to order the City of Phila-
delphia to appropriate funds to continue disability payments to 
policemen and firemen.204 The contractual obligation constituted a 
contract or making educationally detrimental cuts in the school program. The court 
did not indicate what action it would take if the town again rejected a request for the 
money needed to fund the contract. 82 L.R.R.M. at 2007. 
199. 5 N.Y. PERB 3101 (1972). 
200. N.Y. Enuc. !..Aw§ 2023 (McKinney Supp. 1971). 
201. Town of Scituate v. Scituate Teachers' Assn., - R.I. -, 296 A.2d 466 (1972). 
202. - R.I. at -, 296 A.2d at 469. 
203. Teachers Local 958 v. School Comm., 108 R.I. 444, 276 A.2d 762 (1971). 
204. Council 33, AFSCME v. Philadelphia, 81 L.R.R.M. 2539 (1971). 
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debt of the city, the payment of which was enforceable to the same 
extent as obligations incurred under any other contract. 
It should be evident from the above discussion that states are 
increasingly opting for vigorous enforcement of the duty to bargain, 
even where it has ramifications for that most "public" of public 
sector areas, the appropriations process. There seems to be a growing 
realization that past fears concerning the effects of a relatively broad 
duty to bargain have been largely unwarranted. Public employers 
generally have not bargained away their "public trust" at the nego-
tiations table, and the control of public fiscal matters has not been 
taken from the hands of the legislature. The enforcement process has 
made employers aware that there is a difference between hard bar-
gaining and no bargaining, and has instilled in the minds of govern-
ment administrators and appropriating bodies the concept that a 
collective bargaining agreement is a solemn obligation requiring the 
use of best efforts to ensure its implementation. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
In states such as Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, 
and Wisconsin, the trend toward the use of private sector principles 
to guide the development of labor relations in the public sector is 
accelerating. In most of the remainder of the country, however, this 
trend is not so well developed; indeed, it is nonexistent in many 
states. The "leading" states may now be establishing precedents 
which the others will eventually follow, though this is by no means 
certain. The recent establishment of public employment relations 
boards in such states as Kansas and Hawaii205 should add to the num-
ber of "leading" states and further accelerate the development of 
public employee bargaining law. 
The trend toward finding private sector analogues to public 
sector problems has important implications for the bargaining rights 
of public employees. First, it means that judiciary and administra-
tive tribunals are placing more stress on the word "bargaining" and 
less on the word "public." There is a dawning realization that public 
employees are primarily employees and only secondarily government 
employees. Therefore, they should be denied bargaining rights avail-
able to other employees only when there are compelling govern-
mental or public policy reasons for such restrictions. Increasingly, 
the discovery is being made that requiring a public employer to bar-
gain collectively over a relatively wide range of subjects does not in 
205. HAWAil REv. STAT, § 89-5 (Supp. 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4323 (Supp. 1972). 
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itself prejudice the interests of the government. To compel bargain-
ing is not to compel agreement. 
Second, a number of outmoded concepts, of both ancient and 
more recent vintage, are being discarded. Fears that public employee 
bargaining would impinge on the sovereign authority of the state or 
lead to illegal delegations of power by public employers have by and 
large proved not to be justified. The meet-and-confer approach, once 
believed to be a workable compromise between the right of the 
public to control the political process and the right of employees to 
bargain collectively, now appears to be obsolete and may eventually 
disappear altogether. Where doubts concerning the efficacy of full 
collective bargaining in the public sector remain, they are mani-
fested in the enactment of statutory management-rights clauses de-
signed, apparently, to retain a good measure of the public employer's 
discretion with respect to subjects which would otherwise be bargain-
able. Such clauses do little to promote good faith bargaining on the 
part of public employers, and they add to the burdens of courts and 
public employment relations boards to the extent that they require 
clarification in particular fact situations. However, management-
rights clauses may not be insurmountable obstacles to the develop-
ment of a broad scope of bargaining; as one case, IBEW Local 
2219,206 has suggested, the burden may eventually devolve upon the 
employer to show that a management-rights clause has been properly 
invoked in a given case. 
Third, the trend in public sector labor relations toward the 
private sector model suggests that criteria must be developed to 
identify situations in which private sector principles must legit-
imately be modified before they are applied to the public sector. 
There are two primary distinctions between the two sectors: the 
strike proscription and the nature of the political process, including 
budgetary considerations. The strike proscription arguably (although 
not necessarily in fact) denies to government employees a powerful 
economic weapon available to other employees. To compensate for 
the loss of this weapon, some tribunals have made adjustments in 
duty to bargain requirements. One such adjustment is the extension 
of the duration of the duty to include the impasse procedures which 
function in part as strike substitutes. Additionally, the absence of 
the strike weapon may entitle employees to the maintenance of the 
status quo while a new contract is being negotiated. Another adjust-
ment may come about if the Westwood Community Schools tests,207 
206. See text accompanying notes 138-41 supra. 
207. See text accompanying notes 159-61 supra. 
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or at least the rationale for these tests, are adopted generally in place 
of the mandatory-permissive distinction operative in the private 
sector. So long as state legislatures believe that strikes in the public 
sector ought to be proscribed, there may in fact be no reason to ad-
here strictly to the mandatory-permissive distinction. In that case 
the real question relates to the appropriateness of the subject for bar-
gaining and not to the consequences of a refusal to bargain in terms 
of disruption of industrial peace, a key rationale for the strict lines 
between mandatory and permissive subjects in the private sector. If 
strikes are legalized, however, the mandatory-permissive distinction 
would appear to be applicable to the public sector without quali-
fication. 
The relation of collective bargaining to the political process 
raises thorny questions of the rights of public employees versus the 
prerogatives of government. To what extent, for example, is a city 
council free to pass ordinances of obvious community interest, even 
though these may remove arguably mandatory subjects of bargaining 
from the table? The problems become particularly difficult with re-
spect to the budgetary process. To what extent must an employer 
bargain on economic matters when its budget has not yet been drawn 
up, much less approved by the legislature? What are the consequences 
if an agreement is reached but the legislature cuts the budget? How 
much should an employer cut back other operations to pay employees 
according to the terms of the contract? The experience of the past 
few years suggests that these questions can be answered in such a 
way as to guarantee bargaining rights without jeopardizing govern-
ment control of the public fisc. Clearly, there are limitations on the 
extent to which the government may be required to appropriate and 
allocate money, just as there are limitations on the extent to which 
public employees may determine, through the bargaining process, 
policies which are matters in the domain of the community as a 
whole or its elected representatives. But the legitimate expectations 
of public employees should not be thwarted by mere platitudes. The 
determination that bargaining is not appropriate should be made 
only after a searching examination of the competing policies in-
volved. And where an agreement has been reached, it should be 
denied enforcement only if the party seeking denial has carried the 
burden of showing that all alternatives to nonenforcement have been 
exhausted. 
